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THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 
REVISITED 
John M. Greabe∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Half a century ago, in Chapman v. California, the Supreme 
Court imposed on appellate courts an obligation to vacate or 
reverse criminal judgments marred by constitutional error unless 
the government demonstrates that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. But the Court did not explain the 
juridical status of this obligation or its relation to the federal 
harmless-error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111. In the intervening 
years, commentators have struggled to make sense of Chapman. 
Some see it as a constitutional mandate. Others view it as an 
example of constitutional common law. In The Riddle of 
Harmless Error, written shortly after Chapman issued, Justice 
Roger Traynor argued that § 2111 should govern the field that 
Chapman occupies. 
The lack of clarity about Chapman’s pedigree has had the 
predictable consequence of leaving harmless-error doctrine in an 
unsatisfactory state. Most basically, the Court has adopted a 
harmless-error test that unduly privileges constitutional error 
vis-à-vis nonconstitutional error. Moreover, the Court has 
prescribed application of an easily manipulated jurisprudence of 
labels to determine whether an error is amenable to 
harmless-error review. Finally, the Court has unnecessarily 
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complicated the application of harmless-error analysis on 
collateral review and, along the way, shown insufficient regard 
for rule-of-law values. 
This Article takes a fresh look at what the Constitution 
requires of reviewing courts when they conclude that a criminal 
judgment has been tainted by constitutional error. It suggests 
that new insights may be found by situating harmless-error 
doctrine within a broader, transcontextual analysis of how 
constitutional remedies function. It then demonstrates how 
understanding what the Constitution requires of reviewing 
courts can serve as a springboard for necessary reform. 
Ultimately, it argues that the Supreme Court can and should 
jettison Chapman in favor of a simplified, unitary, and 
transcontextual harmless-error test—reconceived as an 
elaboration of 28 U.S.C. § 2111—that largely tracks the approach 
for which Justice Traynor argued. Under this test, a reviewing 
court would set aside any conviction tainted by error unless it 
concludes that it was highly probable that the error did not affect 
the judgment. A reviewing court also would set aside any 
conviction tainted by error if the error undermined fundamental 
constitutional values. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been nearly half a century since Justice Roger J. 
Traynor published The Riddle of Harmless Error.1 The book was 
a response to many of the questions raised and left unanswered 
by the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Chapman v. 
California.2 Chapman is the source of two important, 
interrelated precepts that inform the work of federal and state 
appellate courts on a daily basis. First, a court conducting direct 
review of a criminal conviction is not under an unyielding duty to 
vacate or reverse when a trial judge or prosecutor has committed 
a federal constitutional violation during the judicial proceedings 
that led to the conviction.3 But second, the court must set the 
conviction aside if the government fails to establish that the error 
was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”4 My concern is with 
the second holding—that reviewing courts must provide remedies 
for errors not shown to have been harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. I will refer to this holding as the “Chapman principle.” 
The juridical status of the Chapman principle is an enigma, 
despite the efforts of Traynor and others to shine an illuminating 
light upon it. Although Chapman states that the principle 
derives from federal law,5 the Supreme Court has never specified 
its precise source. Is it a constitutional mandate rooted in 
underlying constitutional criminal trial rights or the obligation of 
                                                     
 1. ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970). As Traynor 
recognized, harmless-error doctrines apply in both the criminal and civil contexts. See, 
e.g., id. at 16–17, 48–49. For the most part, however, Traynor focused on the criminal 
side, where harmless-error standards have received far more attention and proven to be 
far more controversial. I too will confine my focus to harmless-error review on direct and 
collateral review of criminal convictions. 
 2. 386 U.S. 18, 22–24 (1967). 
 3. Id. at 21–22. 
 4. Id. at 24. 
 5. The Court stated: “Whether a conviction for a crime should stand when a State 
has failed to accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a 
federal question as what particular constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they 
guarantee, and whether they have been denied.” Id. at 21. 
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appellate courts to provide due process? Several commentators 
have characterized it in this way.6 Alternatively, is it a 
subconstitutional rule that serves as an example of what 
Professor Henry P. Monaghan calls “constitutional common 
law”?7 Professor Daniel J. Meltzer and others have so described 
it.8 And what is its relation to 28 U.S.C. § 2111, a federal statute 
that directs reviewing courts to withhold remedies for all errors 
that have not affected the substantial rights of the parties?9 
Traynor thought that § 2111 should govern the field that 
Chapman occupies, and he proposed that the Court treat future 
harmless-error decisions as elaborations of the statute.10 
The lack of clarity about Chapman’s pedigree has had the 
predictable consequence of leaving harmless-error doctrine in an 
unsatisfactory state. Most basically, the Supreme Court has 
never offered a coherent defense of its practice of “privileging” 
constitutional errors: i.e., insisting that constitutional errors 
merit a remedy unless shown to have been harmless “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” while requiring that nonconstitutional errors 
be evaluated under a more forgiving standard.11 Moreover, the 
                                                     
 6. See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 
1912–18 (2014) (suggesting that harmless-error analysis be constitutionalized and rooted 
in the Constitution’s due process guarantee); Stephen H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: 
Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 424 n.31 (1980) 
(characterizing the Chapman principle as a “constitutional judgment”). 
 7. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional 
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1975) [hereinafter Monaghan, Constitutional 
Common Law]; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule 
Requirement, 1989 S. CT. REV. 195, 200 n.30 (describing Chapman as an example of 
constitutional common law). Monaghan defines constitutional common law as “a 
substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and 
authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions.” Monaghan, 
Constitutional Common Law at 2–3. 
 8. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 26–29 (1994); Craig Goldblatt, Comment, Harmless Error as Constitutional 
Common Law: Congress’s Power to Reverse Arizona v. Fulminante, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 
1009–12 (1993). I too have subscribed to this description of Chapman. See John M. Greabe, 
Remedial Discretion in Constitutional Adjudication, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 920 & n.197 
(2014). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012) states: “On the hearing of any appeal or writ of 
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record 
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties.” The statute is operationalized in the federal courts through FED. R. CRIM. P. 
52(a) and FED. R. CIV. P. 61, both of which instruct courts to withhold remedies for errors 
that did not affect the substantial rights of a party. 
 10. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 42. 
 11. See Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 695–97 
(2013) (explaining that, while constitutional errors amenable to harmless-error review 
must be shown on direct appeal to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (per 
Chapman), nonconstitutional errors are subject to a “more forgiving standard” and may 
be disregarded where there is “fair assurance . . . that the judgment was not substantially 
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Court’s most important “clarification” of Chapman, provided in 
Arizona v. Fulminante in 1991,12 has caused more problems than 
it has solved. In Fulminante, the Court held that courts 
conducting direct review of convictions should always provide 
remedies for “structural defects,”13 but should conduct 
harmless-error review of all “trial errors.”14 Yet the Court has 
operationalized the Fulminante framework in unprincipled and 
unpredictable ways.15 Finally, on collateral review, the Court 
continues to require application of a confusing, 
more-forgiving-than-Chapman harmless-error test—a practice 
begun in Brecht v. Abrahamson in 199316—even though 
subsequently enacted limitations on the availability of collateral 
relief in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (“AEDPA”) are more than sufficient to protect federalism 
values and address other concerns raised by habeas-based 
reversals.17 
                                                     
swayed by the error”) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). 
 12. 499 U.S. 279, 306–09 (1991). 
 13. Id. at 309 (defining “structural defects” as “defects in the constitution of the trial 
mechanism, which defy analysis by harmless-error standards”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 14. Id. at 307–08 (defining “trial errors” as “error[s] which occur[] during the 
presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed 
in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether [their] admission 
was harmless”). 
 15. For a sampling of the commentary critical of Fulminante, see Roger A. Fairfax, 
Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional Significance of the Jury, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2038–40 (2008) (arguing that the Court is undermining the 
institutional significance of the jury by holding, subsequent to Fulminante, that 
instructional errors that preclude the jury from returning a verdict on all elements of the 
charged offense are nonstructural); David McCord, The “Trial/Structural” Error 
Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1414 (1997) (arguing 
that the structural error/trial error framework is inherently flawed and has proved to be 
unworkable); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of 
Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 154 (1991) 
(criticizing the single-minded focus on the accuracy of convictions inherent in the trial 
error/structural defect dichotomy); see also, e.g., Michael Coenen, Spillover Across 
Remedies, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1211, 1235–39 (2014) (noting that the Fulminante framework 
can cause courts to define structural rights too narrowly in order to avoid the strong 
medicine of automatic reversal); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial 
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 891─92 (1999) (similar); Steven M. Shephard, 
Note, The Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 YALE L. J. 1180, 
1185–86, 1201 (2008) (similar, arguing against a rule of automatic reversal of structural 
errors); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2021 (1998) (similar, discussing the equal protection right protected 
by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
 16. See 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). 
 17. The limiting principles in question are found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012), 
which provides: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 
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In short, the riddle of harmless error is ripe for revisiting. 
This paper undertakes the task. Part I provides essential 
background about the development of the harmless-error 
doctrine and the range of views about its essential nature. It then 
demonstrates the possibility of a conceptual breakthrough by 
supplementing the debate over ontology (what is the Chapman 
principle?) with an analysis of remedial function (how does the 
setting aside of a criminal conviction serve as a remedy for a 
constitutional violation at trial?). A functional approach proves 
useful because it helps to define the border between 
constitutionally compelled and constitutionally gratuitous 
remedies. Generally speaking, the Constitution requires courts to 
provide specific remedies responsive to ongoing constitutional 
violations, but permits courts to weigh the costs and benefits of 
substitutionary remedies for wholly concluded constitutional 
wrongs and to withhold such remedies if their costs would be too 
great. 
This functional insight leads to the paper’s foundational 
hypothesis: while reviewing courts must remedy an ongoing 
infringement of constitutional rights worked by conviction under 
a facially unconstitutional statute or a statute that cannot be 
constitutionally applied on the facts of the case, the Supreme 
Court and Congress are otherwise free to craft harmless-error 
doctrines that reflect the lessons of experience. This freedom 
flows from the fact that, once we set to the side the exception 
involving conviction pursuant to an unconstitutional or 
unconstitutionally applied statute, an order vacating or reversing 
a tainted judgment provides substitutionary relief for a wholly 
concluded wrong; it does not deliver a constitutionally compelled 
remedy. 
Part II turns to the current state of harmless-error doctrine 
and argues that it is unsatisfactory. It exposes three principal 
problems. First, the Supreme Court has adopted a 
harmless-error framework that unduly privileges constitutional 
error vis-à-vis nonconstitutional error. Second, the Court has 
prescribed application of a flawed, easily manipulated 
jurisprudence of labels to determine whether an error is 
amenable to harmless-error review. Third, the Court has 
unnecessarily complicated the application of harmless-error 
                                                     
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 
the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
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analysis on collateral review and, along the way, shown an 
insufficient regard for rule-of-law values. 
Part III begins by observing that, with clarity about how 
little the Constitution requires with respect to harmless-error 
review, the path is open to reforms that could ameliorate each of 
the problems described in Part II. It then argues that the 
Supreme Court should jettison the Chapman principle and 
abandon the structural defect/trial error dichotomy in favor of a 
simplified, unitary, and transcontextual harmless-error test—
reconceived as an elaboration of 28 U.S.C. § 2111—that tracks 
the approach for which Traynor argued in The Riddle of 
Harmless Error. Under this approach, the Court should instruct 
reviewing courts to set aside a judgment tainted by any error 
(whether constitutional or not) unless they conclude that it was 
highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment. 
Beyond this, the Court should emphasize that, even when 
guilty of the crimes charged, appellants and petitioners pressing 
claims of constitutional error serve as private attorneys general 
and therefore function as essential instruments for ensuring 
proper regard for fundamental constitutional values. 
Accordingly, the Court should authorize reviewing courts to 
exercise their power to set aside judgments tainted by error in 
circumstances where, regardless of whether it is highly probable 
that the error affected the judgment, an exercise of remedial 
discretion is necessary to vindicate such values. Such 
circumstances certainly include errors that undermine the 
rights to an impartial judge, a jury instruction that correctly 
states the relevant standard of proof, the assistance of counsel 
for the accused, and a fair jury. They also should include, but 
are not necessarily limited to, judicial proceedings marred by 
unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of race, religion, 
ethnicity, national origin, or gender and intentional misconduct 
by government officials such as judges, prosecutors, and police 
or probation officers. 
II. THE BASICS OF HARMLESS-ERROR REVIEW: EVOLUTION, 
ONTOLOGY & CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION 
A sound solution to a legal problem—indeed, a sound 
solution to most any problem—typically requires an 
understanding of how the problem came to be and the context 
within which it arises. So it is with harmless-error review. The 
path towards improvement opens upon a close analysis of the 
doctrine’s origins and nature, the role it plays within the field of 
remedies, and the constitutional constraints within which it 
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operates. This Part supplies such an analysis and uses it to 
develop the hypothesis that grounds the paper’s call for reform: 
courts conducting harmless-error review must reverse judgments 
that infringe the appellant’s or petitioner’s life, liberty, or 
property interests through an ongoing unconstitutional 
application of positive law but are otherwise free—at least so far 
as the Constitution is concerned—to exercise guided discretion in 
deciding whether an error warrants a remedy. 
A. A Brief History 
1. Harmless Error on Direct Review.  The harmless-error 
doctrine, like so many other American legal doctrines, finds its 
roots in the English common law.18 Historical accounts of the 
harmless-error doctrine’s development frequently begin with 
Crease v. Barrett,19 an 1835 decision of the Court of the 
Exchequer that curtailed the then-prevalent practice in English 
appellate courts to affirm any judgment which, in the opinion of 
the reviewing court, had reached the correct result.20 The Crease 
decision became associated—incorrectly, in the view of Justice 
Traynor—with an emergent, mid-nineteenth century English 
practice of reversing nearly all criminal and civil judgments tied 
to proceedings in which some error had occurred.21 
In 1873, Parliament responded to this perceived appellate 
hypertechnicality with a statute called the Judicature Act, whose 
purpose was to encourage reviewing courts to return to the 
practice of vacating or reversing civil judgments only if they 
thought that the wrong party had won.22 The Judicature Act was 
ineffective; appellate judges continued to order new trials in 
almost all cases in which they found error.23 In 1907, Parliament 
tried again with another new law called the Criminal Appeal Act, 
which directed appellate judges to dismiss criminal appeals, 
notwithstanding any meritorious assertion of error, if “no 
substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.”24 Once 
                                                     
 18. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 4. 
 19. (1835) 149 Eng. Rep. 1353, 1359. 
 20. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 6–8. 
 21. See id. at 4–8 (disagreeing with the depiction of Crease as having adopted a rule 
of near automatic reversal and laying the blame for its mischaracterization on subsequent 
English decisions which did not accurately describe its holding, and on John Henry 
Wigmore, who accepted the accuracy of these mischaracterizations in his famous treatise 
on evidence) (citing 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21, at 368 (3d ed. 1940)) 
 22. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 8–9 (citing the Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 
Vict., c. 66 ¶ 48). 
 23. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
 24. See id. at 10–11 (citing the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 4(1)). 
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again, however, English judges largely ignored the statute and 
continued to reverse with great frequency—a result Traynor 
found surprising in view of the fact that, in the English system, 
the double jeopardy doctrine precluded retrial upon reversal of a 
criminal judgment.25 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
American appellate courts behaved much like their English 
counterparts, applying a rule approximating automatic 
reversal.26 Retrials were common, and appellate courts were 
criticized for “tower[ing] above the trials of criminal cases as 
impregnable citadels of technicality.”27 In 1946, in Kotteakos v. 
United States, the Supreme Court characterized the era as 
follows: “So great was the threat of reversal, in many 
jurisdictions, that criminal trial became a game for sowing 
reversible error in the record, only to have repeated the same 
matching of wits when a new trial had been thus obtained.”28 
American appellate hypertechnicality spurred federal and 
state legislative reform efforts, which were led by prominent 
members of the bar and legal academy.29 In 1919, after 
considerable deliberation, Congress enacted a federal 
harmless-error statute, Judicial Code § 269, 28 U.S.C. § 391, 
which provided: 
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or 
motion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the 
court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire 
record before the court, without regard to technical errors, 
defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties.30 
                                                     
 25. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 11. 
 26. See John M. M. Greabe, Spelling Guilt Out of a Record? Harmless-Error Review 
of Conclusive Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental Misdescriptions, 74 B.U. L. REV. 
819, 823 (1994). I draw with liberality from my previous article in sketching the 
development of harmless-error review in the United States. 
 27. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by 
Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925) (quoted in Kotteakos v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946)). 
 28. 328 U.S. at 759. 
 29. See Fairfax, supra note 15, at 2033 (observing that one prominent reform 
committee included Felix Frankfurter, Roscoe Pound, and William H. Taft); see also 
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 758–60 & nn.10–14 (providing examples of the extent of legislative 
reform efforts and the extensive commentary of prominent legal scholars). 
 30. Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, § 39, 62 Stat. 892, 998. 
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By 1926, eighteen states also had enacted laws directing their 
appellate courts to ignore harmless errors, and ten more had 
established some sort of similar rule by judicial pronouncement.31 
These reform efforts did not have the impact for which their 
proponents had hoped, as American appellate courts continued to 
vacate and reverse with great frequency over the next couple of 
decades.32 In the mid-1940s, however, Congress and the Supreme 
Court took additional steps towards implementing a more 
rigorous application of harmless-error review. Congress did so by 
acquiescing in the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which contained a harmless-error provision that 
tracked the language of the 1919 federal harmless-error statute 
but omitted the descriptor “technical” before the word “errors.”33 
The Supreme Court did so in its Kotteakos decision, which 
constituted the first serious elaboration of how courts should 
conduct harmless-error review under the 1919 statute. 
In Kotteakos, a jury had convicted the petitioners of a single 
conspiracy to violate the National Housing Act even though, as 
the government admitted on appeal, the evidence had established 
eight or more different conspiracies of the same sort conducted 
through a common figure.34 The question presented was whether 
the variance between the single conspiracy charged in the 
indictment and the multiple conspiracies proved at trial 
constituted a technical error or defect that did not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties within the meaning of the 
federal harmless-error statute.35 Holding that the error did not 
fall within the reach of the statute and therefore required the 
                                                     
 31. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 823 n.23 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. 
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6(a), at 258 n.5 (1984)) (internal citations omitted). 
 32. See Fairfax, supra note 15, at 2034. 
 33. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a), which provided that “[a]ny error, defect, 
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded”). The 
then recently enacted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also contained a harmless-error 
provision, FED. R. CIV. P. 61. In 1948, Congress repealed the 1919 federal harmless-error 
statute, see supra note 30, on the view that the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil 
Procedure now contained the necessary directives. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 21 & 
n.86. In 1949, however, Congress enacted the current federal harmless-error statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 2111, out of an apparently misplaced concern that the Federal Rules applied only 
to federal district courts, and not to federal appeals courts or the U.S. Supreme Court. See 
id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 81-352 (1949), as reprinted in 1949 U.S.C. CONG. SERV. 1248, 
1272); see also Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139 § 110, 63 Stat. 105 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2111). The 1949 enactment also omits the adjective “technical,” which had modified the 
phrase “errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties” in the 1919 statute. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. It thus directs 
reviewing courts to disregard all errors that do not affect substantial rights. See supra 
note 9 for the full text of § 2111. 
 34. 328 U.S. at 752. 
 35. See id. at 757–58. 
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award of a new trial,36 the Supreme Court clarified that the 
question hinged on whether the error had “substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”37 
In a thoughtful passage elaborating what the analysis under 
this standard should entail, Justice Rutledge stated: 
Some aids to right judgment may be stated more safely in 
the negative than in affirmative form. Thus, it is not the 
appellate court’s function to determine guilt or 
innocence . . . . Nor is it to speculate upon probable 
reconviction and decide according to how the speculation 
comes out. Appellate judges cannot escape such 
impressions. But they may not make them sole criteria for 
reversal or affirmance. Those judgments are exclusively for 
the jury, given always the necessary minimum evidence 
legally sufficient to sustain the conviction unaffected by the 
error . . . . 
     But this does not mean that the appellate court can 
escape altogether taking account of the outcome. To weigh 
the error’s effect against the entire setting of the record 
without relation to the verdict or judgment would be almost 
to work in a vacuum . . . . In criminal causes that outcome 
is conviction. This is different, or may be, from guilt in fact. 
It is guilt in law, established by the judgment of laymen. 
And the question is, not were [the jurors] right in their 
judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the 
verdict. It is rather what effect the error had or reasonably 
may be taken to have had upon the jury’s decision. The 
crucial thing is the impact of the thing done wrong on the 
minds of other men, not on one’s own, in the total 
setting . . . . 
     This must take account of what the error meant to them, 
not singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all 
else that happened. And one must judge others’ reactions 
not by his own, but with allowance for how others might 
react and not be regarded generally as acting without 
reason. This is the important difference, but one easy to 
ignore when the sense of guilt comes strongly from the 
record. 
     If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that 
the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight 
effect, the verdict and judgment should stand, except 
perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm 
or a specific command of Congress. . . . But if one cannot 
say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened 
                                                     
 36. See id. at 776. 
 37. Id. at 776. 
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without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that 
the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it 
is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not 
affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was 
enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected 
by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself 
had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave 
doubt, the conviction cannot stand.38 
The dictum “perhaps” exempting constitutional errors from 
operation of the statute reflected the practice of the time, which 
was to regard an appellate remedy as mandatory in the event of 
constitutional error.39 
For the next twenty years or so, the Supreme Court treated 
28 U.S.C. § 2111—the new federal harmless-error statute that 
Congress enacted in 1949 to replace the 1919 harmless-error 
statute40—as always requiring a new trial if constitutional error 
had occurred during the initial trial.41 But in 1963, in Fahy v. 
Connecticut,42 the Court retreated from this approach and 
explicitly raised the question whether the erroneous admission of 
evidence obtained by means of a search and seizure that had 
violated the Fourth Amendment “can . . . be subject to the normal 
rules of ‘harmless error’ under the federal standard of what 
constitutes harmless error.”43 Yet the Court declined to decide 
the question it had raised because the admission of evidence at 
the petitioner’s trial had been “prejudicial,” a term that the Court 
defined by stating that “there is a reasonable possibility that the 
                                                     
 38. Id. at 763–65 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 39. Greabe, supra note 26, at 824 & n.33 (citing 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 31, 
at 270). It is not clear why Kotteakos treated the error—the variance between the 
conspiracy charged and the conspiracies proved—as nonconstitutional. The Fifth 
Amendment provides a right of grand jury indictment for an “infamous crime” of the type 
for which the petitioners stood convicted, and the petitioners were not indicted for the 
crimes that the evidence tended to prove. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Moreover, the Sixth 
Amendment provides a right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. One court has suggested that the prohibition on variances 
between a single conspiracy charged in the indictment and multiple conspiracies being 
proved at trial should be understood as a “common law” rule or a rule derived from the 
rules prohibiting prejudicial joinder, and not a constitutional rule. See United States v. 
Baughm, 449 F.3d 167, 175–76 (D.C. Cir. 2006). But the court fails to provide a 
convincing explanation why the victim of such a variance has not suffered a violation of 
his or her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. 
 40. See supra note 33 (explaining the history behind Congress’s 1948 repeal of the 
1919 federal harmless-error statute and its 1949 enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2111). 
 41. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 825 (citing Ogletree, supra note 15, at 157 & n.43 
(collecting cases)). 
 42. 375 U.S. 85 (1963). 
 43. Id. at 86. 
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evidence complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction.”44 
During these same two decades, the Warren Court was 
famously expanding the reach of federal constitutional 
protections for criminal defendants.45 Thus, by the time 
Chapman v. California reached the Court in 1967,46 the field of 
constitutional criminal procedure was ripe for what Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo described as “taming,” a process by which 
novel and potentially far-reaching legal principles are 
“reduc[ed] . . . to something that is both apparently more clear 
and more objective, and apparently less threatening to 
established institutions.”47 Chapman and its progeny have 
certainly served as taming influences in the criminal procedure 
field.48 
Chapman, which reached the Supreme Court from the 
California state court system, involved a situation where a 
prosecutor had commented on the silence of the accused,49 a 
practice held unconstitutional in Griffin v. California in 1965.50 
The California Supreme Court applied the state’s 
harmless-error rule, which directed courts to ignore errors that 
had not caused a miscarriage of justice,51 and affirmed the 
                                                     
 44. Id. at 86–87. 
 45. See, e.g., id.; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that state courts 
must exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal defendants have 
a fundamental Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination requires law enforcement officials to apprise those in custody of certain 
rights). 
 46. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
 47. Greabe, supra note 26, at 825 n.37 (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE 
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921)); Craig Goldblatt, Comment, Disentangling Webb: 
Governmental Intimidation of Defense Witnesses and Harmless Error Analysis, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1239, 1243 n.25 (1992) (same). 
 48. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 825; Ogletree, supra note 15, at 158 (arguing that 
the harmless error rule of Chapman v. California has had the effect of practically diluting 
many of the constitutional procedural protections first recognized by the Warren Court). 
 49. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 19. 
 50. 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (holding that prosecutorial comment about the 
accused’s failure to testify infringes the accused’s Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination). 
 51. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13 provides: 
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground 
of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, 
or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of 
procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the 
evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
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underlying convictions.52 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, 
finding that the error had not been harmless.53 But importantly, 
the Court for the first time explicitly acknowledged that “there 
may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a 
particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they 
may . . . be deemed harmless.”54 
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion for himself and six 
others. He started by observing that “[w]hether a conviction for a 
crime should stand when a State has failed to accord federal 
constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a 
federal question as what particular federal constitutional 
provisions mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have 
been denied.”55 He then elaborated: 
With faithfulness to the constitutional union of the States, 
we cannot leave to the States the formulation of the 
authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect 
people from actions by the States of federally guaranteed 
rights. We have no hesitation in saying that the right of 
these petitioners not to be punished for exercising their 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be silent—
expressly created by the Federal Constitution itself—is a 
federal right which, in the absence of appropriate 
congressional action, it is our responsibility to protect by 
fashioning the necessary rule.56 
Justice Stewart would have avoided the harmless-error 
question and therefore concurred only in the judgment; he would 
have held that a state prosecutor’s violation of the rule in Griffin 
v. California should trigger an automatic reversal.57 Justice 
Harlan dissented on the ground that “a state appellate court’s 
reasonable application of a constitutionally appropriate state 
harmless-error rule to sustain a state conviction constitutes an 
independent and adequate state ground of judgment.”58 
In proceeding to “fashion[]” a harmless-error rule applicable 
to federal constitutional error, Justice Black stated that he and 
others in the majority “prefer the [Fahy v. Connecticut] 
approach . . . in deciding what was harmless error”—“whether 
there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of 
                                                     
 52. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 19–20. 
 53. See id. at 24–26. 
 54. Id. at 22. 
 55. Id. at 21. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 45 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). 
 58. Id. at 46 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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might have contributed to the conviction”59—to the California 
Constitution’s miscarriage-of-justice rule.60 He then equated the 
Fahy statement with the harmless-error principle for which 
Chapman has become known, and stated the Court’s holding: 
“We, therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of [Fahy] 
when we hold, as we now do, that before a federal constitutional 
error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a 
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”61 
In the course of fashioning a new standard of review for 
constitutional error, the Chapman majority did not mention  
28 U.S.C. § 2111, the federal harmless-error statute, or allude to 
the harmless-error analysis conducted in Kotteakos (which was, 
as we have seen, an elaboration of § 2111’s statutory 
predecessor). Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that the Kotteakos inquiry into whether the error 
“had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 
the jury’s verdict”62 is to govern nonconstitutional error, whereas 
the Chapman analysis is to apply to constitutional error.63 The 
Court also has emphasized that it regards the Kotteakos analysis 
as significantly “more forgiving” than the analysis prescribed in 
Chapman.64 
In the years since Chapman, the Supreme Court has flirted 
with three distinct techniques for determining whether an error 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.65 The first, suggested by 
Chapman itself,66 examines only the extent to which the 
                                                     
 59. Id. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86–87 (1963)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). For a discussion of Fahy, see supra notes 42–44 and 
accompanying text. 
 60. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22–23. For a statement of relevant California law, see 
supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 61. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
 62. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). 
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 445–49 (1986). 
 64. See, e.g., Fry v. Pliler, 511 U.S. 112, 116 (2007); see also infra notes 96–97 and 
accompanying text (noting that, in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 621 (1993), the 
Court held that constitutional errors challenged on collateral review should be assessed 
for harmlessness under the Kotteakos/§ 2111 test, which it described as “less onerous” 
than the “stringent” Chapman test). One lower court has characterized the 
Kotteakos/§ 2111 analysis as requiring a reversal unless it is “more probable than not that 
the error did not materially affect the verdict.” United States v. Laurienti, 611 F.3d 530, 
547 (9th Cir. 2010). Compare id., with Stockman v. Oakcrest Dental Ctr., P.C., 480 F.3d 
791, 799 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that nonconstitutional error should be treated as 
harmless “unless it is more probable than not that the error materially affected the 
verdict” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 65. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 828–29. 
 66. 386 U.S. at 23–24 (“An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which 
possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot . . . be conceived of as 
harmless.”). 
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erroneously admitted material tends to be incriminating, without 
regard to the untainted evidence.67 The second looks to whether 
the error was “cumulative”—i.e., duplicative of untainted 
evidence tending to establish the same fact or facts supported by 
the erroneously admitted material.68 The third analyzes whether 
the jury likely gave the erroneously admitted material significant 
weight in light of the entire record.69 The Court appears to have 
settled on the third technique as the one reviewing courts should 
employ.70 
In holding that constitutional errors should be disregarded if 
shown to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,71 the 
Chapman majority acknowledged, and did not retreat from, prior 
decisions indicating “that there are some constitutional rights so 
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as 
harmless error . . . .”72 The majority listed three such rights—the 
right not to have a coerced confession introduced into evidence, 
the right to counsel, and the right to an impartial judge—in 
terms suggesting that the list was not necessarily exhaustive.73 
                                                     
 67. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 828 (citing 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 31, at 
279–81); Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error—A 
Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 16 (1977)). 
 68. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 828 (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 
254 (1969)); Field, supra note 67, at 37). 
 69. Greabe, supra note 26, at 822–23; see Field, supra note 67, at 21–22; see Greabe, 
supra note 26, at 828–29 (citing Yates v. United States, 500 U.S. 391, 403–04 (1991)). 
 70. Greabe, supra note 26 at 829 (citing Yates, 500 U.S. at 403–04 (clarifying that 
Chapman requires reviewing courts to weigh the probative force of the untainted evidence 
against the probative force of the erroneously admitted material standing alone and to 
determine the likely significance of the error upon reasonable jurors); 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, 
supra note 31, at 281 n.5); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1993) 
(endorsing and applying the Yates analysis). The Court has at other times and in other 
contexts suggested that the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt alone renders an 
error harmless. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 829 n.67 (citing, e.g., United States v. 
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510–11 (1983)) (“The question a reviewing court must ask is this: 
absent [the improperly admitted material], is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
jury would have returned a verdict of guilty?”); Milton v. Wainright, 407 U.S. 371, 372–73 
(1972) (similar); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431–32 (1972) (similar)). But these 
statements—which are akin to a “correct result” test of the sort rejected in Chapman, see 
386 U.S. at 23–24—are contradicted by the Court’s more carefully reasoned cases, and 
should not be taken to express the proper formulation. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 829 
n.67 (citing 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 31, at 279, 281). But see United States v. 
Vazquez, 132 S. Ct. 1532, 1532 (2012) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted with respect to a Seventh Circuit decision in which a split panel arguably used 
different harmless-error approaches and the majority arguably used the “correct result” 
approach); Anne Bowen Poulin, Tests for Harm in Criminal Cases: A Fix for Blurred 
Lines, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 991, 992–93 (2015) (discussing Vazquez and opining that 
“[e]xisting Supreme Court precedent does not clearly endorse” any one approach to 
harmless-error review). 
 71. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
 72. Id. at 23. 
 73. Id. at 23 n.8 (citations omitted). 
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In the following quarter century or so, the Court placed 
additional rights within this category on an ad hoc basis.74 But it 
failed to explain how courts should determine whether a given 
constitutional error is amenable to harmless-error review until 
1991, when it decided Arizona v. Fulminante.75 
In Fulminante, a highly fractured Court returned to the 
question whether the erroneous admission into evidence of a 
coerced confession should be subject to harmless-error review 
under the Chapman principle.76 In answering that it should,77 
the Court provided a framework for determining whether other 
constitutional errors should be subjected to analysis under 
Chapman. The Court bifurcated the universe of constitutional 
error and suggested that most errors fall into a default category 
of “trial” errors—“error[s] which occur[] during the presentation 
of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively 
assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to 
determine whether [their] admission was harmless.”78 But the 
Court also acknowledged a second category of “structural 
defects”—“defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, 
which defy analysis by harmless-error standards.”79 More 
recently, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court explained 
that structural defects “bear[] directly on the framework within 
which the trial proceeds.”80 It then provided a list of errors that 
cause such structural defects: errors having the effect of denying 
the right to counsel,81 self-representation,82 a public trial,83 and 
an appropriate reasonable-doubt instruction.84 The Court went 
                                                     
 74. See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (right to a public trial); 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (right to self-representation). 
 75. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
 76. Id. at 306–12 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, 
JJ.). 
 77. See id. at 288, 308–09 (rejecting suggestions to the contrary in Chapman, 386 
U.S. at 23 & n.8, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964), and Payne v. Arkansas, 356 
U.S. 560, 567–68 (1958)). The Fulminante decision contained three different 5–4 
majorities. As just stated, five members of the Court concluded that the admission of a 
coerced confession could in some circumstances be harmless. Id. at 302–03. A second five 
justice majority determined that the confession at issue had indeed been coerced. See id. 
at 282, 285–88 (White, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ.). 
Finally, a third five justice majority decided that the State had not demonstrated the 
error to be harmless. See id. at 295–302 (White, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, 
Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ.). 
 78. Id. at 307–08. 
 79. Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. 548 U.S. 140, 148, 150 (2006). 
 81. See id. at 149–50 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963)). 
 82. See id. at 149 (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78 & n.8 (1984)). 
 83. See id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984)). 
 84. See id. (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993)). 
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on to add to the list errors that have the effect of denying the 
right to counsel of one’s choice.85 
2. Harmless Error on Collateral Review.  From 1967 to 
1993, the Supreme Court applied the Chapman principle to all 
constitutional errors amenable to harmless-error review, 
regardless of whether it was conducting direct review of a state 
court judgment,86 direct review of a federal court judgment,87 or 
review of a federal judgment resolving a collateral attack on a 
state court judgment.88 But in 1993, in Brecht v. Abrahamson,89 
the Court held that federal courts conducting collateral review of 
state convictions marred by constitutional error should apply the 
harmless-error standard from Kotteakos v. United States,90 which 
until then had been applied only to nonconstitutional errors in 
federal criminal cases.91 Thus, a federal court conducting habeas 
corpus review of a state court criminal judgment infected by 
federal constitutional error should leave the judgment 
undisturbed unless the error was shown to have had a 
“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 
jury’s verdict”—a showing that was further described as 
requiring habeas petitioners to establish more than just a 
“reasonable possibility” that the error contributed to the verdict, 
and that the error had resulted in “actual prejudice.”92 
Brecht involved a situation where a state prosecutor had 
used a state criminal defendant’s silence after receiving the 
warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona93 to impeach the 
defendant at trial.94 After stating that the error fell within 
Fulminante’s “trial error” category,95 the Court considered 
whether it should conduct harmless-error review under what it 
                                                     
 85. See id. at 150. This past Term, the Court also held that the unconstitutional 
participation in appellate proceedings by a presumptively biased judge constitutes 
structural error. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (2016). 
 86. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24–26 (1967). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510–11 (1983). 
 88. See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 
579–80 (1986); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372–73 (1972); Anderson v. Nelson, 
390 U.S. 523, 523–24 (1968) (per curiam). 
 89. 507 U.S. 619, 631–33 (1993). 
 90. 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946). For a discussion of Kotteakos, see supra notes  
34–39 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631–32. 
 92. Id. at 637 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 94. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 622–23. Such commentary violates a criminal 
defendant’s due process rights. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976). 
 95. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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called the “stringent” Chapman principle96 or the “less onerous” 
Kotteakos standard.97 The Court opted for the latter, 
emphasizing the state’s interest in the finality of convictions that 
have survived direct review, comity, federalism, the interest of 
maintaining the prominence of the trial itself (which often had 
occurred years earlier), the difficulty of retrials years after the 
original trial, and a perceived imbalance of other costs and 
benefits of applying Chapman on collateral review.98 Assessing 
the error under the Kotteakos standard, the Court concluded that 
it had not had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury’s verdict because the State’s references to 
petitioner’s post-Miranda silence were infrequent and because 
the evidence of petitioner’s guilt was, “if not overwhelming, then 
certainly weighty.”99 
Three years after Brecht, Congress enacted the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, widely 
known as the “AEDPA.”100 The AEDPA contains a provision,  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), that prohibits the granting of a federal 
habeas petition on the ground that a state court has improperly 
adjudicated a federal constitutional claim on the merits unless 
the state’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. . . .”101 In 2003, in 
Mitchell v. Esparza, the Court held that § 2254(d)(1) applies to 
state appellate court determinations that a constitutional 
violation is harmless under Chapman and precludes an award of 
relief unless the state court’s application of Chapman was itself 
unreasonable.102 
In 2007, in Fry v. Pliler, the Court affirmed Brecht’s 
continuing relevance post-AEDPA by rejecting the argument that 
§ 2254(d)(1), as interpreted in Esparza, eliminates the 
requirement that a habeas petitioner satisfy the 
Brecht/Kotteakos harmless-error standard in order to obtain a 
remedy on habeas corpus review.103 Rather, Fry held, courts 
should continue to treat satisfaction of the Brecht/Kotteakos test 
as a precondition of collateral relief.104 In reaching this 
                                                     
 96. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 632. 
 97. Id. at 637. 
 98. See id. at 635–37. 
 99. See id. at 638–39. 
 100. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 101. See id. for the entire text of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
 102. 540 U.S. 12, 17–18 (2003) (per curiam). 
 103. 551 U.S. 112, 119–20 (2007). 
 104. See id. at 119. 
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conclusion, the Court stated that it was “implausible” that the 
AEDPA—which sought to limit rather than expand the 
availability of habeas relief—would replace “the Brecht standard 
of ‘actual prejudice’ with the more liberal AEDPA/Chapman 
standard which requires only that the state court’s harmless 
-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt determination be unreasonable.”105 
The Court continued: “That said, it certainly makes no sense to 
require formal application of both tests (AEDPA/Chapman and 
Brecht) when the latter obviously subsumes the former.”106 
Confusingly, however, in its 2015 decision in Davis v. Ayala, 
the Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for reading Fry as 
authorizing courts entertaining habeas petitions to skip to the end 
and only apply the less forgiving Brecht/Kotteakos harmless-error 
standard in cases where they conclude that a petitioner has 
satisfied the standard.107 The Court stated that, while (per Fry) a 
federal habeas court need not formally apply both the 
Brecht/Kotteakos and AEDPA/Chapman tests, “that does not 
mean, as the Ninth Circuit thought, that a state court’s 
harmlessness determination has no significance under Brecht.”108 
Thus, although the Brecht/Kotteakos test “obviously subsumes” 
the AEDPA/Chapman test,109 reviewing courts convinced that an 
award of relief is appropriate should not simply apply the 
Brecht/Kotteakos test without also taking stock of whether a state 
appellate court’s Chapman analysis was unreasonable within the 
meaning of § 2254(d).110 The Court also emphasized that, in order 
to conclude that a state appellate court’s finding of harmlessness 
under Chapman was unreasonable, a habeas court must find that 
“fair-minded jurists could [not] disagree on its correctness”—i.e., 
that the state appellate court’s decision “was so lacking in 
justification that there was an error well understood and 
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fairminded disagreement.”111 
3. Summary.  We have seen that federal harmless-error 
doctrine has evolved in such a way that it now encompasses a 
multi-tiered system that distinguishes among four different 
                                                     
 105. Id. at 119–20 (citations omitted) 
 106. Id. at 120. 
 107. See 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015). 
 108. Id. (“The Fry Court did not hold—and would have had no possible basis for 
holding—that Brecht somehow abrogates the limitation on federal habeas relief that 
§ 2254(d) plainly sets out.”). 
 109. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2198. 
 111. Id. at 2199 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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categories of error: (1) constitutional “structural” errors, which 
defy analysis by harmless-error review;112 (2) constitutional 
“trial” errors challenged on direct review, which are  
reviewed for harmlessness under the Chapman principle;113  
(3) nonconstitutional trial errors challenged on direct review, 
which are reviewed for harmlessness under the Kotteakos test;114 
and (4) constitutional trial errors challenged on collateral review, 
which also are reviewed for harmlessness under the 
Brecht/Kotteakos test.115 Beyond this, federal law also supplies a 
different, “plain-error” framework for evaluating errors as to 
which appellate rights have not been preserved.116 Under 
plain-error review, errors (even constitutional structural 
errors)117 warrant vacatur or reversal only if they were obvious at 
the time they were committed, affected the substantial rights of 
the claiming party, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, 
or public reputation of the judicial proceedings in which they 
occurred.118 And as set forth above, additional complications 
come into play when federal courts conduct collateral review of 
errors of federal constitutional law that have been found 
harmless by the state’s appellate courts.119 Thus, the framework 
under which error is to be evaluated in the federal system is 
exceptionally complicated.120 
B. The Ontology of Chapman & Its Progeny 
Because the Chapman majority said only that the case’s 
holding was responsive to a “federal question,”121 the holding’s 
                                                     
 112. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. The Court has never suggested 
that a nonconstitutional trial error might be “structural”; indeed, it has implied the 
opposite. See Coenen, supra note 11, at 695 n.33. 
 115. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 116. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing how claims of 
error that have been forfeited should be reviewed for plain error under FED. R. CRIM. P. 
52(b)). 
 117. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997) (stating that structural 
errors are not subject to automatic reversal but, like other errors, are to be evaluated 
under the method prescribed in Rule 52(b) and Olano). 
 118. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731–37. 
 119. See supra notes 102–111 and accompanying text. 
 120. In an excellent recent article, Professor Anne Bowen Poulin canvasses the 
various tests (which include but are not limited to the harmless-error tests applied by 
reviewing courts and described above) under which courts evaluate the concept of “harm” 
in criminal cases. See Poulin, supra note 70, at 1007–13. As Professor Poulin 
demonstrates, the complexity of these various tests is truly mind-boggling. 
 121. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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essential nature (and, by extension, that of Fulminante122 and 
Brecht123) has perplexed commentators. In The Riddle of 
Harmless Error, published three years after Chapman,124 Justice 
Traynor defended the Chapman majority’s “federal question” 
holding over Justice Harlan’s dissenting objection125 that a state 
court’s reasonable application of a state harmless-error rule 
should constitute an independent and adequate state ground of 
judgment not subject to federal review.126 But Traynor expressed 
puzzlement over why the Chapman majority had failed to 
recognize that the federal harmless-error statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2111, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) already 
occupied the terrain that Chapman purported to cover.127 
Traynor thought that, going forward, the Court ought to rectify 
its oversight and rerationalize harmless-error doctrine as an 
interpretation of § 2111.128 Other analysts, in contrast, have 
suggested that the Chapman principle should be seen as 
constitutional in nature.129 
Professor Daniel J. Meltzer refutes both positions in the 
most thorough analysis of Chapman’s ontology that has been 
published to date.130 In disagreeing with Traynor that Chapman 
and its progeny are rooted (or at least ought to be seen as rooted) 
in § 2111 and Rule 52(a), Meltzer first observes, correctly, that 
Rule 52(a) has no bearing on cases such as Chapman that 
originate in state courts.131 With respect to § 2111, Meltzer notes 
that the statute enjoins courts to ignore errors that do not affect 
                                                     
 122. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra notes 1–2. 
 125. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 126. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 37–41. Traynor thought that a state 
harmless-error rule could apply only if it were procedural, and not substantive. See id. at 
38–39. But in Traynor’s view, state harmless-error rules are clearly substantive. See id. at 
39–40 (stating that such a rule “has nothing to do with regulating the methods by which 
the facts are made known to the court” but rather is “of a piece with substantive rules, for 
it too is a mandate to the judge, at this stage the appellate judge, calling for the last word 
on the legal effect of the findings”). 
 127. See id. at 42. 
 128. See id. (“Once the Chapman case is viewed anew, the crucial question is one of 
statutory interpretation, the meaning of the words in Section 2111, ‘errors or defects 
which do not affect substantial rights.’”). As we shall see, Justice Traynor then argued for 
abandonment of Chapman’s beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in favor of an analysis, 
rooted in § 2111, that would focus on whether it was “highly probable” that the error had 
not affected the jury. See id. at 43–51. 
 129. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 19–21, 26. 
 131. See id. at 19–20 (observing that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
regulate neither state court cases nor Supreme Court review of such cases but govern only 
federal court procedure in criminal cases). 
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substantial rights; it does not direct them to vacate or reverse 
judgments where substantial rights are affected.132 Moreover, 
unlike Chapman, the statute neither explicitly regulates state 
courts engaged in harmless-error review nor differentiates 
between constitutional and nonconstitutional error.133 Thus, it is 
not plausible to view the Chapman principle as a product of 
statutory interpretation. 
If the Chapman principle is not rooted in a federal statute, 
does it derive from the Constitution itself? In other words, is its 
implicit promise of a remedy unless the government establishes 
the harmlessness of a constitutional error beyond a reasonable 
doubt constitutionally compelled? Meltzer devotes much of his 
paper to consideration of this question, doing far more to develop 
an argument in favor of a constitutional basis for the Chapman 
principle than any writer who has so characterized the ruling.134 
But Meltzer ultimately concludes that the Chapman principle is 
not derived from the Constitution, and, having thus eliminated 
both federal statutory law and the Constitution itself as potential 
sources of the rule, argues that it is an example of constitutional 
common law.135 
As the next subsection explains, I agree with Meltzer that the 
remedy Chapman implicitly promises is not constitutionally 
compelled, with the qualification that the Constitution does 
require reviewing courts possessed of jurisdiction over a case to 
reverse when they find that an applicant for relief has been 
convicted under a statute that is unconstitutional, either facially 
                                                     
 132. See id. at 20. Section 2111’s preoccupation with authorizing reviewing courts to 
affirm some judgments notwithstanding the presence of error—rather than specifying 
when they should provide remedies—is understandable, Meltzer noted, when one 
appreciates that it was enacted to curb hypertechnical vacaturs and reversals. See id.; see 
also supra notes 26–39 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the historical 
period in question). The full text of § 2111 is set forth in note 9, supra. 
 133. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 21. Meltzer also briefly considered and rejected a 
second potential statutory argument—viz., that Chapman could be seen as necessary to 
preserve the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review federal constitutional 
rulings arising from the state courts. See id. at 21–23. The argument here would be that, 
if states were permitted to adopt harmless-error statutes that too readily withhold 
remedies for violations of federal constitutional rights, they effectively could insulate the 
underlying constitutional rulings from Supreme Court review under the 
independent-and-adequate state ground doctrine. See id. at 22. But as Meltzer observed, 
the Court could stymie such a possibility simply by holding the state ground for denying 
relief—i.e., harmlessness under a permissive state harmless-error statute—either 
“inadequate” to foreclose Supreme Court review, see id. at 22, or tantamount to a denial of 
state appellate review altogether, see id. at n.93. Either way, the Supreme Court then 
would be free to review the merits of the state court’s federal constitutional ruling. 
 134. See id. at 1–26. 
 135. See id. at 26. 
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or as applied.136 But I arrive at that conclusion through an 
examination of how vacating or reversing a criminal judgment 
functions as a remedy for a constitutional violation, and not 
through an ontological analysis of the sort Meltzer conducted.137 
Still, because Meltzer’s analysis is persuasive and corroborative, I 
precede my argument about what the Constitution requires with a 
summary of his, deferring to the next subsection consideration of 
Professor Richard M. Re’s recent argument that the Chapman 
principle should be seen to originate in the due-process 
guarantee.138 
The principal difficulty with any argument that the 
Constitution requires reviewing courts to provide remedies for 
constitutional errors not shown to have been harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that the Supreme Court repeatedly has 
stated (albeit in dicta) that criminal defendants have no 
constitutional right to an appeal.139 For how can a remedy be 
constitutionally obligatory if its means of delivery is a matter of 
legislative grace? Meltzer first addresses whether these dicta are 
correct through consideration of a range of arguments that have 
been or could be made in favor of a constitutional right to an 
appeal. 
The conventional view that there is no constitutional right to 
appeal a criminal judgment is grounded in the Constitution’s text 
and history. The Constitution does not explicitly confer or 
implicitly assume such a right, no such right existed in English 
or colonial practice, and no such right was recognized in the 
States at the time of the Founding.140 Moreover, Congress 
provided no right to appeal criminal judgments in the federal 
courts when it enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789.141 Indeed, it 
was not until 1891 that Congress extended the right of appeal to 
all federal criminal defendants.142 
                                                     
 136. See infra Part II.C. I also agree with Meltzer that the Chapman principle is best 
viewed as constitutional common law. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 137. See infra Part II.C. 
 138. See Re, supra note 6, at 1914–16. 
 139. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 2 & nn.9–10 (collecting cases). Since Meltzer 
published his article, the Supreme Court has continued to state that the federal 
Constitution provides no right of appeal. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 
160 (2000); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110 (1996); Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 119 
(1995) (per curiam). 
 140. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 6 & nn.25–27 (collecting authority). 
 141. See id. at 6 & n.28 (citing David Rossman, “Were There No Appeal”: The History 
of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 522, 556–59 
(1990)). 
 142. See id. at 6 & n.29 (citing, inter alia, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517 § 5, 26 Stat. 
827). 
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Nevertheless, several writers have argued that a more 
nuanced view of the history complicates any assertion that there 
was no right to appeal a criminal judgment at common law.143 In 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these writers point out, 
many jurisdictions employed procedures that served some of the 
functions of the modern appeal, including circuit riding, 
post-conviction motions, trials before multi-judge panels, 
executive and legislative review of criminal convictions, trial de 
novo in a higher court, and (sometimes) review by means of a 
writ of error.144 But, as Meltzer notes, the most that can be said 
of this history is that its existence complicates rejection of an 
argument for a constitutional right to appeal a conviction purely 
on the basis of history. The relevant history certainly does not 
provide fertile soil for the advancement of such an argument.145 
Meltzer next addresses closely related arguments that 
appeals have assumed such importance in American state and 
federal criminal practice as to reflect a consensus that appellate 
review of convictions is now constitutionally necessary,146 and 
that proper application of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing 
calculus147 reveals that a right to appeal a criminal conviction is 
now an aspect of American procedural due process.148 Meltzer 
finds more force in these arguments than in any argument from 
history.149 Still, Meltzer observes, there are important 
countervailing concerns150 and very strong reasons to doubt that 
today’s Supreme Court would find these arguments 
persuasive.151 
At this point, Meltzer switches gears and assumes arguendo 
that, notwithstanding what has just been said, there is a 
constitutional right to appeal criminal judgments. He then 
further assumes that this hypothetical right to appeal would 
require the provision of a remedy in at least some class of cases 
                                                     
 143. See id. at 7. 
 144. See id. at 7 & nn.31–36 (collecting authority). 
 145. Id. at 8. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 148. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
 149. See id. at 9. 
 150. See id. at 9 n.45 (“The massive increase in appellate dockets in recent years 
suggests that the institutional burden imposed by a constitutional right to appeal would 
be . . . considerable” and that, therefore, “constitutionalizing a right to appeal might be 
thought to give insufficient weight to the third Mathews factor, the burden imposed on the 
government.”). 
 151. See id. at 9 n.46, (explaining why, based on his or her voting history, each 
member of the 1994 Court would likely reject any argument that the Constitution confers 
on criminal defendants a right to appeal). 
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involving judgments marred by error.152 Building from these 
assumptions, Meltzer considers whether the Chapman principle 
might be seen to operationalize such a right. He concludes, again 
convincingly, that the Chapman principle cannot plausibly be so 
characterized. For one thing, a right to reversal in certain 
circumstances derived from a constitutional right to appeal a 
criminal conviction seemingly would encompass any error that 
might have led (or probably led, or almost certainly led, etc.) to 
an erroneous conviction. But Chapman’s implicit promise of a 
remedy for any error not shown to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt extends only to federal constitutional error, and 
not to other outcome-affecting errors.153 
Moreover, acceptance of a constitutional right to appeal in 
criminal cases cannot explain Chapman’s requirement that state 
courts apply a federal harmless-error rule in deciding whether to 
provide a remedy for a federal constitutional error at trial. At 
most, such a right would promise an opportunity to challenge a 
state criminal conviction in a state intermediate appellate court. 
Assume that such a court, finding that federal constitutional 
error had occurred at trial, ignores Chapman and applies a more 
forgiving state harmless-error rule to affirm the conviction. The 
federal right to appeal a conviction would have been observed in 
such a situation, but not Chapman’s additional mandate that a 
federal standard of review be applied to determine the 
availability of a remedy. Thus, Chapman requires more of state 
courts than vindication of any hypothetical federal constitutional 
right to an appeal in criminal cases.154 
Having refuted the argument that the Chapman principle 
derives from a hypothetical (although doubtful) federal 
constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction, Meltzer next 
considers whether it can be explained by other constitutional 
doctrines. Meltzer frames these arguments in terms of potential 
constitutional limits on “state power” to adopt a harmless-error 
principle other than Chapman,155 but his responses to these 
arguments also establish that there would be no constitutional 
barrier to the adoption of a rule other than Chapman to govern 
review of constitutional error at federal trials. 
                                                     
 152. As Meltzer puts it, “Presumably, chief among the purposes of recognizing such a 
right would be to reduce the likelihood that a defendant has been convicted at a trial that 
violated his rights, constitutional or otherwise. To promote that purpose, an appeal must 
promise reversal of the conviction in appropriate cases.” Id. at 10. 
 153. See id. at 10–11. 
 154. See id. at 11–12. 
 155. See id. at 12. Meltzer titles Part II of his article “Other Possible Constitutional 
Limits on State Power to Treat Errors as Harmless.” Id. 
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The first principle Meltzer evaluates is the Constitution’s 
promise of equal protection in the provision of benefits that are 
not themselves constitutionally required—viz., the principle that, 
although the government need not provide criminal appeals, it 
cannot, for example, restrict the right to appeal “to persons who 
are white or Protestant or whose last names begin with Q.”156 As 
Meltzer demonstrates, the Chapman principle does not derive 
from this equal protection principle. The adoption of a 
harmless-error rule materially different and more permissive 
than the one that Chapman prescribes—say, a rule that treats 
constitutional and nonconstitutional errors (whether state or 
federal) alike but permits courts to withhold remedies if they 
conclude that that the error probably did not affect the 
judgment—would not discriminate against either federal rights 
in general or particular federal rights. Nor would such a rule 
otherwise work a suspect classification. It therefore would not 
conflict with equal protection principles, for it could hardly be 
said to lack a rational basis.157 
Next, Meltzer considers whether the Chapman principle is 
needed to avoid violating the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine—viz., the principle that makes it unconstitutional, for 
example, for a state “to set up libraries restricted to Democratic 
users” even though “a state need not establish public libraries at 
all.”158 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not require 
the application of Chapman to constitutional trial errors. As 
Meltzer puts it: 
[T]o object that a state cannot condition its appeals on 
enforcement of a harmless-error standard less favorable to 
defendants than Chapman requires some independent 
explanation of why the Constitution requires the Chapman 
standard—an analogue to the First Amendment right of 
library patrons not to belong to the Democratic party [in the 
example recited above].159 
Thus, any argument based on the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine brings us back to the problem of independently 
establishing a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to 
                                                     
 156. Id. (observing that this principle explains the Supreme Court’s holdings that 
states may not constitutionally deny indigent appellants free transcripts, see Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956), or appointed counsel, see Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353, 356–58 (1963), or the effective assistance of counsel on appeal, see Evitts v. 
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985)). 
 157. See id. at 14. 
 158. Id. (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1413, 1421–28 (1989)). 
 159. Id. at 14–15. 
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application of the Chapman principle on review of a 
constitutional error committed at the defendant’s trial.160 
Finally, Meltzer considers whether the Chapman principle 
might be tied to the rule of judicial integrity sometimes described 
in terms of a court’s obligation to apply “all the relevant law,” 
including the Constitution—an obligation that animated the 
analysis in Marbury v. Madison.161 Such an argument would 
begin with the premise that appellate courts, like other courts 
with jurisdiction over a case, are obliged to apply the 
Constitution to the cases they adjudicate. It might then conclude 
that application of the Constitution on appeal demands a remedy 
for criminal convictions tainted by constitutional error unless the 
requirements of the Chapman principle are satisfied.162 Yet any 
such argument runs up against (1) our history of regarding as 
valid recognized limitations on the power of appellate courts to 
consider only some of the issues presented in a given case, and 
(2) our more general practice of permitting courts to withhold 
remedies for past violations of constitutional rights.163 So long as 
we continue to accept the legitimacy of this firmly entrenched 
history and these remedial customs, the Chapman principle 
cannot be seen as a constitutional imperative that binds 
reviewing courts to provide remedies for constitutional trial 
errors unless the government has shown those errors to be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.164 
C. Constitutional Obligation: A Working Hypothesis & Response 
to Professor Re 
As noted in the previous subsection, Professor Meltzer’s 
ontological analysis is convincing. Any claim that the Chapman 
principle finds its roots in the Constitution is undercut by the 
fact that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal 
judgment—a point that the Supreme Court has continued to 
                                                     
 160. Id. at 15. Any argument that Chapman is constitutionally compelled based on 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine also fails for a second reason: “Not all 
constitutional rights are implicated in unconstitutional conditions cases. By its very 
nature, the doctrine serves to protect only those rights that depend on some sort of 
exercise of autonomous choice by the rightholder, such as individual rights to speech, 
exercise of religion[,] or privacy . . . .” Id. at 15 (quoting Sullivan, supra note 158, at 1426) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). A more permissive harmless-error rule than 
Chapman would not put pressure on a criminal defendant to forego the exercise of his or 
her other constitutional rights. See id. 
 161. See id. at 15 (citing, inter alia, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,  
177–78 (1803)). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at 16–17. 
 164. See id. 
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emphasize since Meltzer published his article165—and the 
additional fact that the Chapman principle cannot plausibly be 
traced to any doctrine that constrains government in the 
provision of constitutionally gratuitous benefits. Moreover, even 
if there were a constitutional right to appeal a criminal 
judgment, Chapman imposes obligations that make it impossible 
to characterize the Chapman principle as a logical extension of 
any such right. 
But there is another path that leads to the conclusion that 
the remedy implicitly promised by the Chapman principle—i.e., 
vacatur or reversal unless the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable 
-doubt condition is satisfied—is not constitutionally compelled. 
The alternative path looks to how that remedy typically 
functions—viz., as a substitutionary remedy for the 
constitutional deprivation worked during the judicial proceedings 
that led to the claimant’s conviction. For substitutionary 
constitutional remedies designed to ameliorate wholly concluded 
constitutional wrongs, although critical tools for incentivizing 
compliance with constitutional norms, are not themselves 
constitutionally necessary. 
In recent work, I have developed and defended this 
argument, along with a corresponding claim that the 
Constitution does require remedies for ongoing constitutional 
injuries when relief is sought through justiciable and properly 
preserved claims brought in proper forums.166 This argument is 
descriptive in its origins; it is rooted in the extant doctrines and 
practices that combine to comprise the law of constitutional 
remedies.167 Yet the described reality—one that the Supreme 
                                                     
 165. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 919–23; see also John M. Greabe, Constitutional 
Remedies and Public Interest Balancing, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 892–96 (2013). 
 167. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 907–19; see also Greabe, supra note 166, at 863–92. 
My descriptive approach to the problem of constitutionally compelled remedies tracked 
that of Professors Fallon and Meltzer, who in 1991 published an influential article on the 
same topic that argued: (1) there should be a strong but not always unyielding 
presumption in favor of individually-effective relief for every constitutional violation; and 
(2) there must exist a sufficient scheme of available remedies to ensure that constitutional 
rights do not become nullities and that government officials remain answerable as a 
systemic matter to the demands of the law. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. 
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
1731, 1787–91 (1991). Fallon and Meltzer explained that their aim in using a descriptive 
approach, rather than seeking to develop a purely normative theory, was “to achieve 
enhanced clarity of doctrinal understanding; we hope to further comprehension of what 
courts have done and continue to do, and of the presuppositions that undergird their 
pattern of decisions.” Id. at 1737. In building upon Fallon and Meltzer’s groundbreaking 
work, I used the same approach because I too hoped to rationalize unexplained but 
principled judicial behavior. See Greabe, supra note 166, at 859–60. I thus took the 
remedial status quo as a given and did not seek to engage, for example, Professor John 
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Court has never explicitly rationalized—is in fact also 
normatively sensible. I will explain why shortly. But first, I 
provide an overview of the different ways courts treat claims for 
specific relief from ongoing constitutional injury and claims for 
substitutionary relief for wholly concluded constitutional 
violations. 
In the context of constitutional litigation, specific remedies 
typically enable a rightholder to halt an ongoing (or avoid an 
imminent) deprivation of a life, liberty, or property interest 
protected by the Constitution.168 In this way, they seek to provide 
or restore to the rightholder the very same interest that the 
Constitution protects.169 Specific constitutional remedies include 
rulings nullifying unconstitutional statutes or rules under which 
coercive enforcement proceedings (such as criminal charges) are 
brought; rulings enjoining such proceedings in circumstances 
where the statute or rule authorizing the action cannot 
constitutionally be applied on the facts of the case; injunctions 
and declarations that operate to prohibit ongoing or imminent 
rights violations other than unconstitutional enforcement 
actions; the provision of access to a judicial officer through the 
Great Writ of habeas corpus (so long as Congress has not 
lawfully suspended its availability); just compensation for 
takings; and make-whole relief for the coercive collection of 
unconstitutional taxes, duties, or fees.170 
Substitutionary remedies, in contrast, provide “something 
else” to the rightholder.171 The quintessential substitutionary 
remedy is a monetary damage award. In fact, remedies treatises 
sometimes speak as though money is the only form of 
                                                     
Harrison’s originalist argument for a theory of constitutionally compelled remedies built 
on the “private right” remedial framework that existed in the nineteenth century. See, 
e.g., John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 
GEO. L.J. 2513, 2516–17 (1998). For a fascinating exchange that captures the difference 
between the Fallon/Meltzer approach and that of Professor Harrison, compare id., with 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 
2549–65 (1998). 
 168. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 905 & n.133 (citing Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a 
“Specific” Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 126 (2006)). Of course, there are situations where 
specific remedies only formally halt the ongoing constitutional deprivation by declaring it 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) 
(reaffirming the unconstitutionality of separating students by race in public education but 
requiring only that the defendant districts desegregate “with all deliberate speed”). In 
such situations, the effects of the unconstitutional custom or policy at which the judgment 
is directed may linger indefinitely. 
 169. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 905 & n.133. 
 170. See id. at 909–10; see also Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury 
Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 696 (1990). 
 171. Greabe, supra note 8, at 905–06 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a “Specific” Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 126 (2006). 
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substitutionary remedy.172 And sure enough, courts do in fact 
sometimes vindicate constitutional rights through monetary 
damage awards.173 But in the context of constitutional litigation, 
two other substitutionary remedies are far more common. The 
first is the exclusion of evidence at trial when the evidence was 
obtained pursuant to a wholly concluded invasion of rights, such 
as a search that violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights or an interrogation that violated the defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment rights.174 The second is the topic presently under 
examination: the vacatur or reversal of a lower court judgment 
when constitutional error—e.g., a failure to exclude evidence that 
the Constitution prohibited the jury from hearing—occurred 
during the judicial proceedings leading to the judgment.175 
Notice that there tends to be a fundamental difference 
between the nature of the constitutional violations that ground 
claims for specific remedies and that of the violations that ground 
claims for substitutionary remedies. Situations permitting the 
imposition of specific remedies typically involve challenges to 
ongoing constitutional violations, which themselves are almost 
always rooted in unconstitutional government policies or 
customs—viz., unconstitutional statutes, rules, regulations, 
practices, broadly applicable understandings, or the decisions of 
those who function as government policymakers.176 Situations 
where only a substitutionary remedy is possible, in contrast, 
usually involve the wholly completed, discretionary actions of 
those persons to whom we necessarily entrust government power 
                                                     
 172. See, e.g., JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 2.2 (2d ed. 2006); 
ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 1 (7th ed. 
2005) (“Substitutionary relief substitutes money for the specific relief.”). 
 173. Courts sometimes award monetary damages against individuals who have 
misused federal power pursuant to the cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971), and 
against municipalities and individuals who have misused state power under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. This complex area of law is summarized in Greabe, supra note 166, at 866–68, 
881–84. 
 174. See Greabe, supra note 166, at 868–71, 884–85; see also Arnold H. Loewy, 
Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally 
Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907, 907–09 
(1989). 
 175. See Greabe, supra note 166, at 871–72, 885–87; Ogletree, supra note 15, at 157. 
 176. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (addressing ongoing prison 
population overcrowding with a court-mandated population limit). Consider the practical 
barriers to getting to court to seek injunctive or declaratory relief responsive to an 
imminent or ongoing invasion of rights by an individual government actor—e.g., a police 
officer or prison guard—who is simply exercising the discretion required of all law 
enforcement officers and cannot plausibly be characterized as administering a specific 
custom or policy adopted by a government policymaker. For further discussion on specific 
remedies, see Greabe, supra note 8, at 911–12. 
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and ask that it be exercised according to constitutional norms in 
variable and dynamic circumstances not specifically addressed by 
an applicable custom or policy.177 
In the former context—that involving a challenge to a 
facially unconstitutional “law” (broadly construing that term) or 
a law that cannot constitutionally be applied in the 
circumstances presented—the Supreme Court has regarded a 
remedy precluding future application of the law as 
constitutionally required so long as it is sought by means of a 
justiciable and properly preserved claim brought in a proper 
forum.178 But in the latter context—that involving a post hoc 
request for relief responsive to the completed, discretionary 
conduct of one exercising government power with no concomitant 
request that an unconstitutional law be enjoined—the Court has 
authorized the withholding of remedies under doctrines such as 
the qualified-immunity doctrine, exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule, and (most pertinently) the various harmless-error principles 
discussed above in Part II.A.179 
Although it has never so explained its actions, the Supreme 
Court has behaved sensibly in treating specific remedies to 
ameliorate ongoing constitutional violations—when sought by 
means of justiciable and properly preserved claims asserted in 
proper forums—as constitutionally necessary, while treating 
substitutionary remedies responsive to wholly completed 
constitutional wrongs as contingent and subject to being 
withheld in circumstances where their negative effect on the 
                                                     
 177. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395–97 (noting the availability of money damages 
after unconstitutional arrest and search). For further discussion on substitutionary 
remedies, see Greabe, supra note 8, at 910–11. The qualifier “usually” is necessary 
because it is possible to experience a violation of one’s rights that, although concluded, is 
rooted in an unconstitutional custom or policy that remains ongoing when a remedy is 
sought. See id. at 911 n.155 (giving as examples claims addressed to wrongs rooted in an 
unconstitutional municipal custom or policy or in an unconstitutional sentencing 
guidelines regime). In such cases, the victim may seek both specific relief (a declaration 
that invalidates the legal regime that authorized the wrong) and a substitutionary 
remedy for the harm actually suffered. 
 178. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 917–19; see also, e.g., Plata, 563 U.S. at 526 
(observing that it “would raise serious constitutional concerns” to read the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to foreclose a remedy for an ongoing unconstitutional prison 
overcrowding (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 
(1986))); id. at 502, 545 (observing that the ongoing constitutional violation of prison 
overcrowding “requires a remedy”). 
 179. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that 
“government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”). 
For further discussion on remedy-limiting doctrines, see Greabe, supra note 8, at  
912–17. 
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public interest would be too great. Specific remedies are more 
directly rooted in the text and structure of the Constitution than 
their substitutionary counterparts; they far more directly 
operationalize claims brought to enforce structural values such 
as federal supremacy, federalism, and the separation of federal 
powers into three branches, including a judicial department 
entrusted with judicial review.180 Indeed, the Constitution 
explicitly contemplates the specific remedies of access to a 
judicial officer through the Great Writ of habeas corpus,181 and 
the provision of just compensation for a taking.182 And the other 
specific remedies responsive to constitutional violations183 are 
easily seen as constitutionally necessary when we recall that 
they: (1) act to stop ongoing unconstitutional conduct at the 
lawmaking level (where the effects of the unconstitutional law 
are broadly applicable and likely to be experienced again and 
again by others); and (2) therefore serve as the means by which 
courts perform the quintessential function of judicial review, 
which is to keep the coordinate federal branches and the States 
within constitutional bounds.184 
In contrast, substitutionary remedies for constitutional 
violations—money damage awards, the exclusion of evidence, 
and the vacatur or reversal of judgments because of a 
constitutional error at trial—lack any direct link to the text or 
structure of the Constitution. It is for this reason that 
substitutionary constitutional remedies are pervasively regarded 
as products of subconstitutional common law lawmaking185—at 
least in circumstances where they are not statutorily 
authorized.186 By their very nature, they provide less narrowly 
tailored relief than specific remedies deliver, for they fail to 
prevent, halt, or undo the constitutional violations to which they 
respond.187 Moreover, they frequently engender significant and 
controversial costs that third parties who were not directly 
involved in the right-violating event must bear.188 To be sure, 
                                                     
 180. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 921. 
 181. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 182. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 183. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 922 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 163, 177 (1803)). 
 185. See id. at 920 n.197 (collecting authority); see also Meltzer, supra note 8, at 26. 
 186. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (authorizing monetary damage awards for 
constitutional violations). 
 187. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 920–21; cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 
141 (2009) (noting the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in deterring Fourth Amendment 
violations in the future). 
 188. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 921 (citing People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 
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substitutionary constitutional remedies are crucial mechanisms 
for ensuring adherence to constitutional norms; eliminating them 
without replacing them with effective alternatives would invite 
too much underenforcement of constitutional norms. But while 
they are integral to our constitutional order as a class, they also 
are properly regarded as individually contingent and susceptible 
to legislative or judicial expansion, contraction, or replacement as 
the perceived public interest dictates.189 
The functional analysis I have just summarized brings us, 
with an important qualification,190 to the same conclusion 
reached by Professor Meltzer—viz., that the Chapman principle’s 
implicit promise of relief in cases where the government fails to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt the harmlessness of a 
constitutional trial error does not deliver a constitutionally 
compelled remedy. This conclusion (as qualified) serves as the 
foundational hypothesis for the rest of the paper. For if we accept 
that the Constitution ordinarily imposes no barrier to reform, we 
can proceed to consider whether the doctrines governing 
harmless-error review might in fact beneficially be reformed, and 
the paths any such reforms might take. Parts III and IV take up 
these questions. But before moving on, I address an argument 
that, if accepted, would undermine my hypothesis and preclude 
reform efforts of the type I propose. 
Obviously, my hypothesis is built from a characterization of 
appeals and habeas petitions challenging constitutional trial 
                                                     
(N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (“The criminal is to go free because the constable has 
blundered.”)). 
 189. See Greabe, supra note 166, at 893; see also Meltzer, supra note 167, at 2564–65 
(noting that many of the concerns about negative effects on the public interest raised by 
actions for substitutionary relief against individual officers are not present in lawsuits to 
enjoin ongoing unconstitutional practices that might affect large numbers of individuals). 
 190. The qualification is that, when the claim is for specific relief from the ongoing 
application of a criminal statute that is facially unconstitutional or cannot 
constitutionally be applied, the reviewing court must afford relief. It is widely recognized 
that, when a court has jurisdiction and is faced with a justiciable, properly preserved, and 
meritorious claim of this sort, a remedy is constitutionally necessary. See, e.g., RICHARD 
H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 718 (6th ed. 2009); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural 
Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1391–92 (2007). Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
treated the obligation to provide relief responsive to this sort of claim as so obvious that it 
does not even list a trial court’s failure to dismiss a prosecution brought pursuant to a 
facially unconstitutional law (or to a law that cannot constitutionally be applied) as 
“structural” error. See supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. Rather, it simply 
provides relief without any further consideration of whether it should withhold a remedy 
under harmless-error doctrine. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) 
(reversing conviction based on facial unconstitutionality of statute under which 
prosecution was brought); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2093–94 (2014) 
(reversing conviction because criminal statute could not constitutionally be applied on the 
facts of the case). 
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errors committed by judges and prosecutors—other than review 
of the erroneous failure to dismiss a prosecution brought on the 
basis of a facially unconstitutional statute or a statute that 
cannot constitutionally be applied191—as involving claims for a 
substitutionary remedy (the vacation or reversal of a judgment of 
conviction) responsive to isolated and wholly concluded 
constitutional wrongs (e.g., the admission of evidence that should 
have been excluded under the Self-Incrimination or 
Confrontation Clauses). But in a recent article, Professor Richard 
M. Re proposes a different characterization of the harm done 
when evidence is unconstitutionally admitted or excluded at 
trial.192 Re argues that, when a judgment of conviction is entered 
at the conclusion of a criminal trial marred by an 
unconstitutional evidentiary ruling, a second constitutional 
violation takes place—a deprivation of the defendant’s liberty 
without due process.193 What’s more, this second constitutional 
violation is ongoing from the moment the judgment of conviction 
is entered, and it requires a remedy as a matter of constitutional 
law when brought to the attention of a reviewing court unless the 
government is able to show that admission of the evidence was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.194 In other words, the 
Chapman principle’s implicit promise of relief unless the 
government establishes harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt 
delivers a constitutionally compelled remedy responsive to an 
ongoing deprivation of the defendant’s due process right not to be 
convicted at a trial where evidence that might have played a role 
in the decision to convict was unconstitutionally admitted.195 
Re’s call for recognition of such a due process right will be 
attractive to many who are concerned about the Supreme Court’s 
recent expansion of remedy-withholding doctrines such as 
qualified immunity, exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and 
harmless error.196 But it is difficult to reconcile with the doctrines 
and practices that, at present, constitute the law of constitutional 
remedies. Most basically, such a right could be enforced only by 
means of a procedural mechanism that the Supreme Court 
                                                     
 191. See supra note 190. 
 192. See Re, supra note 6, at 1912. In the article, Re’s principal purpose is to argue 
that the Constitution’s due process clauses require the exclusion at trial of evidence 
obtained pursuant to searches and seizures that violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. 
at 1887. I do not here engage this interesting and well-developed argument. Rather, I 
address only Re’s comparatively brief suggestion that the due process clauses also require 
appellate courts to apply the Chapman principle. 
 193. See id. at 1912. 
 194. See id. at 1915–17. 
 195. See id. 
 196. I count myself among their ranks. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 926–27. 
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repeatedly has said is not constitutionally required—namely, 
appeal from a criminal judgment.197 Therefore, Re either must 
provide a reason why the Supreme Court’s statements are wrong, 
or locate the right within some doctrine that places constitutional 
limits on the provision of constitutionally gratuitous 
procedures.198 Otherwise, the right would be singular among 
criminal constitutional trial rights in that there would be no 
constitutionally required process for its vindication. This would 
be powerful evidence of its nonexistence, given our constitutional 
commitment to requiring some procedural means for 
ameliorating an ongoing, individualized violation of 
constitutional rights.199 
There are other reasons to doubt that one convicted at a trial 
in which material evidence was unconstitutionally admitted or 
excluded is suffering an ongoing constitutional violation separate 
and apart from the underlying admission or exclusion of 
evidence. The appellate judgment call that vindication of the 
right would entail only rarely would curb further application of a 
broadly applicable unconstitutional custom or policy that, if left 
unchecked, might potentially also deprive others of their 
rights.200 Rather, in most cases, such a judgment call simply 
would require an appellate court to decide on a unique set of facts 
whether the trial judge incorrectly failed to enforce a 
constitutional boundary and, if so, whether the trial judge’s error 
was harmless.201 And the underlying trial court ruling—which at 
bottom is the constitutional actus reus that Re’s due-process 
theory targets—is a quintessentially discretionary, point-in-time 
judgment call of a type that, if deemed erroneous by a reviewing 
court, does not require the provision of a remedy as a matter of 
constitutional law.202 Although the effects of such mistakes 
undoubtedly persist, we do not conceptualize the violations 
themselves as ongoing. We do not, in other words, understand 
the Constitution to promise a right to be free from detention after 
a trial in which ontologically “unconstitutional” evidentiary 
rulings have been handed down. Rather, we understand the 
Constitution to promise only a right to a trial in which an 
                                                     
 197. See supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra notes 156–164 and accompanying text. Re does not argue that there is 
a constitutional right to appeal or suggest that there is another ground for 
constitutionalizing the Chapman principle notwithstanding the absence of such a right. 
 199. See supra notes 178, 180–184. 
 200. See supra notes 177, 183–184 and accompanying text. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See supra notes 185–189 and accompanying text. 
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unbiased and duly appointed judge will rule on constitutional 
challenges as they are raised. 
Finally, prevailing principles governing the provision of 
remedies on collateral review are inconsistent with the argument 
that a person convicted of a crime after a material and 
constitutionally erroneous evidentiary ruling endures a separate, 
ongoing constitutional violation. A habeas court that disagrees 
with a state appeals court’s determination that a constitutional 
trial error was harmless under Chapman does not simply grant 
the writ; rather, the court is under a mandate to accord an extra 
measure of deference and withhold a remedy unless the state 
appeals court’s Chapman ruling was itself patently 
unreasonable.203 Such a remedy-withholding principle would not 
be possible if a habeas applicant with a meritorious claim that a 
state appellate court misapplied Chapman was seen to be 
presenting a claim for specific relief directed at an ongoing 
constitutional wrong—at least so long as courts continue to 
regard a remedy as constitutionally obligatory in such 
circumstances.204 We should be reluctant to begin recognizing 
exceptions to this foundational principle of constitutional 
remedies. 
III. ASSESSING THE STATUS QUO: A NEED FOR REFORM 
The Supreme Court’s major harmless-error decisions have 
not been models of clarity. As we have seen, Kotteakos suggested 
without explanation that its elaboration of how to apply the 
federal harmless-error statute would “perhaps” not apply to 
constitutional error even though the statute did not distinguish 
between constitutional and nonconstitutional error.205 Moreover, 
Chapman did not specify the source of the authority by which it 
                                                     
 203. See supra notes 100–106. 
 204. That courts do regard a remedy as obligatory when an applicant for habeas 
relief presents a justiciable and properly preserved claim for relief directed at an ongoing 
constitutional violation may be seen in the doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 
(1989). Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion—which has subsequently been treated by the 
Court as controlling, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 190, at 1242, requires a habeas court 
to provide a remedy when the Supreme Court issues a “new rule” that makes previously 
punishable conduct constitutionally protected. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 307–10 (O’Connor, 
J., plurality opinion). This rule operationalizes the promise of relief for a truly ongoing 
constitutional violation in a context—collateral review—that is otherwise quite 
begrudging with respect to remedies. 
 205. See supra notes 30, 38–39 and accompanying text (discussing Kotteakos and 
setting forth the text of the federal harmless-error statute at the time Kotteakos was 
decided). Kotteakos also failed to explain why the error it was reviewing—a variance 
between the conspiracy charged in the indictment and the conspiracies proved at trial—
was not of constitutional dimension. 
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imposed its holding on state courts.206 And as we shall see, 
Fulminante adopted a jurisprudence of easily manipulated 
labels, Brecht recast Kotteakos in terms that bear little 
resemblance to the original, and the Court’s more recent 
decisions about application of harmless-error analysis on 
collateral review appear to be animated more by a hostility 
towards collateral relief than a commitment to the principled 
application of precedent. Given this history, it is not surprising 
that the present state of harmless-error doctrine is 
unsatisfactory. This Part provides a critique of current doctrine 
that sets the stage for the reforms advocated in Part III. 
A. The “Privileging” of Constitutional Error 
In Chapman, the Supreme Court tacitly decided to 
“privilege” constitutional trial errors over nonconstitutional trial 
errors.207 It did so by instructing appellate courts to apply a 
stricter, “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard—rather 
than the more forgiving Kotteakos “substantial and injurious 
effect or influence” standard (which the Chapman majority did 
not discuss)—in evaluating the harmlessness of constitutional 
trial errors.208 The Court took this action even though the federal 
harmless-error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111, draws no distinction 
between constitutional and nonconstitutional errors.209 
The Court has never attempted to rationalize its practice of 
privileging constitutional errors in the context of harmless-error 
review. The Court has not suggested, for example, that it 
requires constitutional privileging because it views parties 
challenging convictions as private attorneys general who help 
secure compliance with constitutional norms by judges and 
                                                     
 206. See supra Part II.B. 
 207. I am indebted to Professor Michael Coenen for the term “constitutional 
privileging.” See Coenen, supra note 11. Coenen’s article presents a powerful, 
transcontextual argument urging skepticism towards constitutional privileging. Coenen 
considered and found wanting a number of arguments that might be made in favor of the 
practice based on either the perceived intrinsic preeminence of constitutional law, see id. 
at 712, or, alternatively, possible extrinsic reasons for treating constitutional law as 
preeminent. See id. at 728–29. Coenen argued that one of the doctrinal areas that would 
benefit from elimination of constitutional privileging is harmless-error review. See id. at 
741. I fully agree and, in Part IV, propose a reformed approach to harmless-error review 
that would eliminate the practice. 
 208. See supra notes 55–64 and accompanying text. 
 209. The statutory predecessor to § 2111, 28 U.S.C. § 391, stated that courts should 
disregard “technical” errors that did not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Act of 
Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 
Stat. 892, 998. But there is no basis to conclude that Congress intended the statutory 
reference to “technical” errors to differentiate between constitutional and 
nonconstitutional errors. 
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prosecutors.210 Rather, the Court appears simply to have 
assumed that mistakes of constitutional dimension are somehow 
more likely to have compromised the accuracy of the verdict than 
nonconstitutional errors. The assumption is unwarranted. 
To understand why, consider the following passage from 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Webster v. Doe.211 Webster 
adopted constitutional privileging in a different context; it held 
that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, termination 
decisions by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
under the National Security Act of 1947 were subject to 
constitutional but not statutory challenges.212 But Justice 
Scalia’s dissenting argument makes a point that also rings true 
with respect to constitutional and nonconstitutional trial errors: 
Perhaps . . . a constitutional right is by its nature so much 
more important to the claimant than a statutory right that 
a statute which plainly excludes the latter [from judicial 
review] should not be read to exclude the former unless it 
says so. That principle has never been announced—and 
with good reason, because its premise is not true. An 
individual’s contention that the Government has reneged 
upon a $100,000 debt owing under a contract is much more 
important to him—both financially and, I suspect, in the 
sense of injustice that he feels—than the same individual’s 
claim that a particular federal licensing provision requiring 
a $100 license denies him equal protection of the laws, or 
that a particular state tax violates the Commerce Clause. A 
citizen would much rather have his statutory entitlement 
correctly acknowledged after a constitutionally inadequate 
hearing, than have it incorrectly denied after a proceeding 
that fulfills all the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause.213 
So too with persons who were convicted after criminal trials that 
were marred by error. Surely, at least in ordinary circumstances, 
such persons are unlikely to care particularly about whether the 
error was rooted in the Constitution, a statute, or a rule of 
evidence or criminal procedure. Rather, the principal concern will 
                                                     
 210. Compare, in this respect, the deterrence rationale underlying the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 
(2011) (“The [exclusionary] rule’s sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future 
Fourth Amendment violations.”). For criticism of the Court’s single-minded focus on the 
accuracy of convictions in developing a harmless-error jurisprudence, see infra note 324. 
 211. 486 U.S. 592, 606–21(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 212. See id. at 594 (discussing the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) 
(1982) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 3036(e)(1) (2006 & Supp. I 2012)). 
 213. Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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be with the error’s likely prejudicial effect—i.e., how likely it is 
that the error played some role in the decision to convict. 
Consider, for example, a criminal defendant whose federal 
jury trial on an indictment charging that he was a felon in 
possession of a firearm214 ends in conviction after the trial judge 
has committed two separate errors. First, the judge erroneously 
admitted into evidence, over the defendant’s objection, a Trace 
Summary authored by an unknown employee of the federal 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives that 
tended to show that the firearm had traveled in interstate 
commerce. Admitting such evidence in this way violated the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.215 Second, 
the judge, again over the defendant’s objection, permitted the 
prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s extensive 
criminal history and to argue that such evidence tended to show 
both the defendant’s bad character and the likelihood that he 
had committed the crime with which he was charged in 
accordance with that bad character, in violation of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, rule 404(b)(1).216 
Suppose further that, at trial, the defendant never contested 
the fact that the firearm in question had moved in interstate 
commerce. Rather, his defense was that the firearm had been 
planted on him and that he therefore had not knowingly 
possessed it. In such a situation, the defendant is going to be far 
more concerned about the Rule 404(b)(1) error than the 
Confrontation Clause error. Quite clearly, the Rule 404(b)(1) 
error is far more likely to have played a role in the jury’s decision 
to convict. And yet, harmless-error principles instruct reviewing 
courts to be more parsimonious in providing a remedy for the 
Rule 404(b)(1) error. This makes no sense, particularly in view of 
the fact that the principles governing harmless-error review have 
never been justified in terms other than an error’s putative effect 
on the verdict.217 
                                                     
 214. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a person convicted of a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to knowingly possess a firearm 
that has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. 
 215. See United States v. Roberts, 419 F. App’x 155, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding 
that the admission of a Trace Summary in such circumstances violates the Confrontation 
Clause). 
 216. Rule 404(b)(1) states: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible 
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the character.” 
 217. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 
161, 172 (2001) (criticizing application of a stricter harmless-error test for constitutional 
errors on the ground that there is no basis for regarding constitutional errors as 
categorically more serious than nonconstitutional errors); see also TRAYNOR, supra note 1, 
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There also are practical reasons to view skeptically the 
efficacy of the mandate that constitutional trial errors be 
assessed under the “stringent” Chapman principle while 
nonconstitutional errors be evaluated under the “less onerous” 
Kotteakos standard.218 Some of our most respected judges have 
opined that relatively slight variations in standards of review do 
not actually affect the outcomes of judicial decisions.219 In this 
respect, reread the explanation of how to apply the federal 
harmless-error statute Justice Rutledge provided in Kotteakos,220 
compare it with the harmless-error analysis Justice Black 
prescribed in Chapman,221 and consider whether a faithful 
application of these supposedly distinct standards would lead to 
different outcomes in a nonnegligible number of cases.222 Many 
                                                     
at 48–49 (lamenting the complications caused by different tests for evaluating 
constitutional and nonconstitutional error and opining that a properly formulated and 
calibrated unitary test would naturally take into account the nature of the error in 
assessing whether it required a remedy). 
 218. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 219. See, e.g., United States v. Lombard, 102 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1996) (opinion of 
Boudin, Cir. J.) (expressing doubt that case outcomes are much affected by the imposition 
of a “clear and convincing evidence,” rather than a “preponderance of the evidence,” 
standard of proof); Richard A. Posner, Comment on Professor Gluck’s “Imperfect Statutes, 
Imperfect Courts”, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 14 (2015) (stating that, although appellate 
courts and law professors are forever “complexifying” law by purporting to apply a 
number of different standards of appellate review, “the only real as opposed to nominal 
difference is between plenary review, of pure issues of law, and mildly deferential review, 
of findings of fact and applications of legal doctrines to facts found by the lower court or 
agency”); cf. Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 643 (2015) (detailing how judges and their law clerks frequently confuse or 
ignore the “deference regime”—i.e., the standard of review or burden of proof that governs 
a case—of a given precedent and then proceed to misapply the precedent in a different 
context). 
 220. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (stating that an error is to be 
disregarded if “the conviction is sure that [it] did not influence the jury,” but should not be 
disregarded “if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened 
without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not 
substantially swayed by the error” or “if one is left in grave doubt” whether the error “had 
substantial influence”). 
 221. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (stating that the error should not 
be disregarded if “there is a reasonable possibility that [it] might have contributed to the 
verdict” or if the reviewing court cannot “declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt”). 
 222. The Court’s use of the descriptor “stringent” in connection with the Chapman 
principle and “less onerous” in connection with the Kotteakos/§ 2111 standard—provided 
as they were in the context of adopting a laxer standard for review of constitutional error 
on collateral review, see supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text—may well have been 
intended to signal lower courts to operationalize harmless-error review on habeas in a far 
more lenient manner than a fair reading of Kotteakos would imply. Certainly, the Court’s 
subsequent treatment of the Kotteakos/§ 2111 standard on collateral review strongly 
suggests just such an intention. See infra Part II.C. But this only highlights another 
problem with the status quo of harmless-error review: that precedent is not to be taken at 
face value. 
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commentators—including two Supreme Court Justices—have 
said that the answer is “no.”223 In fact, even within the more 
demanding realm of Chapman (and therefore certainly within 
the more lenient realm of Kotteakos), there is a pervasive sense 
that, too often, only one thing really matters to most judges and 
clerks when they read trial court records to assess whether an 
error was harmless: the strength of the evidence of guilt. As 
Anthony Amsterdam has put it: 
In theory, the standard by which appellate courts are 
supposed to test the harmlessness of most constitutional 
errors in the pretrial process and at trial is whether the 
judges are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error did not contribute to the guilty verdict or the 
sentence. But in practice, it much more often boils down to 
whether the appellate judges think that the prosecution’s 
evidence of guilt was potent and the sentence well deserved. 
   . . .  When appellate judges decide to reject a claim of 
error on harmless-error grounds, they very often do not say 
anything at all about the claim in their opinion. When they 
do say that the claim has been considered and rejected on 
harmless-error grounds, their explanation for why they 
regard any possible error as harmless is ordinarily brief 
and unrevealing, often conclusionary, almost always 
immune to criticism or review because it is case-specific 
and therefore opaque to anyone not thoroughly familiar 
with the record of the particular case.224 
Finally, there are grounds for questioning whether a 
violation of positive law occurring during the proceedings leading 
                                                     
 223. Judge Harry T. Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit has stated that it is hard to discern any material difference between the 
Chapman principle and the Kotteakos/§ 2111 standard. Harry T. Edwards, To Err is 
Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1167, 1179 (1995); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 86–87 
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that the difference between the Chapman 
principle and the Kotteakos/§ 2111 standard involves an “ineffable gradation[] of 
probability” that is “quite beyond the ability of the judicial mind (or any mind) to grasp, 
and thus [is] harmful rather than helpful to the consistency and rationality of judicial 
decisionmaking”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 (1993) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing the demanding nature of the Kotteakos/§ 2111 inquiry and 
stating that the difference between the Chapman principle and the Kotteakos/§ 2111 
standard is “less significant than it might seem”); Poulin, supra note 70, at 1013–15 
(convincingly denouncing the impossibly fine and meaningless distinctions among the 
Supreme Court’s various tests for harm in criminal cases). 
 224. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the 
Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, November 22, 2004, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 405–06 (2004) (footnotes omitted). Professor Amsterdam’s sense of 
how harmless-error review often proceeds in practice accords with my own, based on my 
thirteen years as a career law clerk to three different federal appeals court judges. 
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to a criminal conviction—e.g., the admission of evidence that 
should have been excluded under the Federal Rules Evidence, 
rule 404(b)(1) in the hypothetical posited earlier in this 
subsection—ever should be regarded as “nonconstitutional” error. 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent reluctance to 
ascribe constitutional significance to violations of state and 
nonconstitutional federal law, many experts believe that the 
Constitution’s due process clauses originally were understood to 
require adherence to all positive-law procedural rules applicable 
at criminal trials—or at least all positive-law procedural rules 
that function as part of the process for obtaining criminal 
convictions.225 And, of course, original meaning is dispositive for 
a number of members of the Court when it comes to setting the 
metes and bounds of the due-process guarantee.226 
The scope of due process is one of the most contested topics 
in constitutional law, and there is no need to enter into the 
debate for present purposes. It is enough to say that the Court’s 
use on direct review of two putatively different standards for 
assessing the harmlessness of violations of positive law at trial—
one applicable to “constitutional” violations and the other 
applicable to “nonconstitutional” error—almost certainly implies 
more about the nature of due process than some members of the 
Court intend to say. For this additional reason, it is time for the 
Court to stop differentiating between constitutional and 
nonconstitutional error in its harmless-error doctrines. 
B. The Structural Defect/Trial Error Dichotomy 
In Fulminante, the Supreme Court differentiated between a 
default category of “trial errors” amenable to harmless-error 
review and what has turned out to be a very small category of 
“structural defects” that require vacation or reversal of the 
affected conviction when it is challenged on direct review.227 
Subsequently, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court 
described the latter category of error as one with effects that bear 
                                                     
 225. See Re, supra note 6, at 1939–42 (citing, inter alia, Nathan S. Chapman & 
Michael W. McConnell, Essay, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L. J. 1672, 
1679 (2012); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 
YALE L.J. 408, 420–21 (2010); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the 
Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 497 (1997); Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due 
Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 343 (1987)). 
 226. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting); id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 
2640 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 227. See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text. 
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“directly” on “the framework within which the trial proceeds.”228 
But whether the Court believes that an error bears with 
sufficient directness on the trial framework to qualify as 
“structural” has proved to be no more predictable than whether 
the pre-1937 Court thought that activity bore with sufficient 
directness on interstate commerce to bring it within Congress’s 
regulatory power.229 In other words, the Court’s trial 
error/structural defect dichotomy has generated a results-driven 
jurisprudence of labels. 
There is no shortage of criticism of the Fulminante 
framework,230 so I will not dwell on the subject at length. 
Instead, I will illustrate the unsatisfactory state of the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area by discussing the incoherent manner 
in which the Court has dealt with the questions of whether and 
how reviewing courts should review for harmlessness jury 
instructions that inaccurately describe, or fail to describe 
altogether, an element of a charged offense (instructions 
containing “elemental misdescriptions” or “elemental omissions”), 
or that direct the jury to presume that an element of the charged 
offense has been established by the trial evidence once it has 
found certain predicate facts (instructions setting up “mandatory 
presumptions”).231 Such instructions have the effect of permitting 
the jury to convict without having found each element of the 
offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, as the Sixth 
Amendment jury-trial right and due process require.232 
                                                     
 228. 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006). 
 229. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555 (1995) (describing how, in 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36–38 (1937), the Court “departed 
from the distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects on interstate commerce” in favor 
of a more realistic analysis that asked whether regulated activities “have such a close and 
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate 
to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions”). 
 230. See supra note 15. 
 231. This terrain is covered in far more detail in Fairfax, supra note 15, at 2040–51, 
and Greabe, supra note 26, at 830–44. 
 232. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (noting the 
unconstitutionality of jury instructions that fail to require the jury to find an element of the 
crime charged); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520–24 (1979) (holding 
unconstitutional jury instructions that direct the jury to presume an element of the crime 
charged upon finding certain predicate facts regardless whether the presumption is 
conclusive or rebuttable); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that “the Due 
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”). 
An instruction setting up a conclusive (rather than a rebuttable) mandatory presumption—
i.e., an instruction that requires the jury to make an elemental determination upon finding 
certain predicate facts—is unconstitutional for a second reason as well. It invades the jury’s 
province by deterring it from considering any evidence relevant to the issue as to which the 
presumption is established but not relevant to the predicate factual findings that serve to 
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On the one hand, the Court has long emphasized that a 
reviewing court should respect the jury’s role as the fact finder 
and not hold an error harmless on the ground that it would have 
convicted had it been empaneled as the jury at the defendant’s 
trial.233 This is why, in Sullivan v. Louisiana, the Court held that 
an inaccurate reasonable-doubt instruction is a structural defect 
impervious to harmless-error review.234 The question is not 
“whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty 
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty 
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable 
to the error.”235 Yet this is a meaningless question where the 
guilty verdict is based on an inaccurate instruction from the trial 
judge on the standard by which the jury is to judge guilt: 
There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable 
-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty 
beyond a reasonable-doubt would have been rendered 
absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless. 
There is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error 
scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can 
conclude is that a jury would surely have found the 
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—not that the 
jury’s actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
would surely not have been different absent the 
constitutional error. That is not enough. The Sixth 
Amendment requires more than appellate speculation 
about a hypothetical jury’s action, or else directed verdicts 
for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an 
actual jury finding of guilty.236 
If the Court were to apply this same line of reasoning to jury 
instructions containing elemental misdescriptions or omissions, 
and to jury instructions setting up mandatory presumptions, it 
would be compelled to conclude that such instructions also give 
rise to structural defects—at least in ordinary trial 
circumstances. After all, just like a defective reasonable doubt 
instruction, such an instruction ordinarily precludes the jury 
from returning a complete verdict rendered according to proper 
legal standards. The qualification “ordinarily” is necessary, 
however, because there might be situations where the improper 
                                                     
trigger the presumption. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 84–88 (1983) (plurality 
opinion). 
 233. See, e.g., Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946) (“[T]he question 
is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt has been found by a 
jury according to the procedure and standards appropriate for criminal trials . . . .”). 
 234. 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993). 
 235. Id. at 279 (emphasis omitted). 
 236. Id. at 280 (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
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instruction pertained only to an element of a crime of which the 
defendant was acquitted, where the defendant admitted to the 
element of the offense that was the subject of the improper 
instruction, or where the jury (after otherwise being properly 
instructed) made some other finding that necessarily also implied 
the “missing” finding. And, indeed, in Carella v. California, four 
members of the Court proposed that just such a three-part test be 
applied in reviewing for harmlessness jury instructions 
containing elemental misdescriptions or omissions, or setting up 
mandatory presumptions.237 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has resisted the logic 
of the argument described in the preceding two paragraphs and 
instead treated such instructions as giving rise to run-of-the-mill 
trial errors. In 1986, in Rose v. Clark, the Court held that jury 
instructions containing rebuttable mandatory presumptions are 
subject to ordinary harmless-error review.238 In 1987, in Pope v. 
Illinois, the Court extended the holding of Rose to jury 
instructions containing elemental misdescriptions.239 And in 
1989, in Carella, the Court extended the holding of Rose to jury 
instructions containing conclusive mandatory presumptions.240 
In all three cases, the Court avoided discussion of the tension 
between the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee and 
application of harmless-error review to instructions containing 
errors which permit the jury to convict without actually having 
found each element of the offense charged—or without actually 
having made other findings that necessarily implied the missing 
finding—under the appropriate standard of proof.241 
                                                     
 237. See 491 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined 
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun). 
 238. 478 U.S. 570, 579–82 (1986) (implicitly rejecting the Court’s plurality opinion in 
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983), in which the Court had held that a conclusive 
mandatory presumption can only be harmless if the defendant was acquitted of the 
charge in question or if the defendant affirmatively conceded the issue on which the 
presumption was established). In 1991, in Yates v. Evatt, the Court followed Rose and 
reiterated that a rebuttable mandatory presumption may be harmless. See 500 U.S. 391, 
402–11 (1991) (conducting harmless-error review and concluding that the error was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 239. See 481 U.S. 497, 502–03 (1987). 
 240. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1989) (per curiam). 
 241. See Rose, 478 U.S. at 580–84 (stating that an instruction setting up a rebuttable 
mandatory presumption if the jury finds certain predicate facts may be harmless because 
the jury must still find the predicate facts and in many cases those predicate facts will 
conclusively establish the presumed element so that no rational jury could find the 
predicate facts without also finding the presumed element); Pope, 481 U.S. at 501–04 
(stating that an instruction misdescribing an element of the offense may be harmless 
because the jury must still find the misdescribed element and it is possible that the 
tainted finding might conclusively establish the missing finding); Carella, 491 U.S. at 
266–67 (stating that an instruction setting up a conclusive mandatory presumption if the 
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Finally, in 1999, the issue came to a head in Neder v. United 
States.242 In Neder, the defendant was charged with a number of 
offenses including filing false income tax returns in violation of 
26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).243 The district court, following then-binding 
circuit precedent, erroneously failed to instruct the jury to decide 
whether the false statements in the returns were material.244 
The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the district 
court’s mistake gave rise to a structural defect because it 
deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment jury-trial right 
in circumstances where he was not acquitted of the offense, 
where he did not admit materiality, and where the jury did not 
make other findings that necessarily implied a finding of 
materiality.245 The Court then held that this elemental omission 
was harmless error because the evidence of materiality was 
overwhelming and uncontested.246 
In reaching this holding, the Court relied on Rose and its 
progeny which, as we have seen, held that appellate courts 
should conduct harmless-error review of instructional errors that 
have the effect of causing the jury not to make formally proper 
findings on each element of the offense charged.247 The Court 
also explicitly distanced itself from the analysis in Sullivan 
described in detail above.248 Instead, the Court narrowed 
Sullivan by stating that a mistaken reasonable doubt instruction 
gives rise to a structural defect only because it “vitiates all the 
                                                     
jury finds certain facts may be harmless because the jury must still find the predicate 
facts and in many cases those predicate facts will conclusively establish the presumed 
element). Rose alternatively suggested that “the jury would have found it unnecessary to 
rely on the presumption” because of overwhelming evidence of the missing element, and 
that such evidence also rendered the error harmless. See 478 U.S. at 583 (quoting 
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 97 n.5 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting)). But in Yates, 
the Court rejected this alternative line of reasoning and admonished reviewing courts 
that harmless-error review of instructions setting up rebuttable mandatory presumptions 
involves more than mere appellate inquiry into what a properly instructed jury likely 
would have concluded. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 406–07 & n.11 (1991). As we 
shall see momentarily, however, the Court subsequently retreated from the more 
demanding analysis it insisted upon in Yates. See infra notes 250–251 and accompanying 
text. 
 242. 527 U.S. 1 (1999). 
 243. See id. at 6. 
 244. See id. at 6–7 (noting that the trial took place before the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), which held that materiality in 
such cases must be determined by the jury). 
 245. See id. at 13–14. 
 246. See id. at 15–20. 
 247. See id. at 9–15. 
 248. See supra notes 233–236 and accompanying text. 
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jury’s findings and produces consequences that are necessarily 
unquantifiable and indeterminate.”249 
The Court did not explicitly concede that its adoption of an 
“overwhelming evidence” test to govern review of elemental 
omissions was in logical conflict with another recent Court 
precedent.250 Nor did it formally acknowledge that it was 
retreating from the Bollenbach principle.251 But, in response to 
Justice Scalia’s blistering separate opinion,252 the Court all but 
admitted that its holding was outside the logic of its 
harmless-error precedents: 
It would not be illogical to extend the reasoning of Sullivan 
from a defective “reasonable doubt” instruction to a failure 
to instruct on an element of the crime. But, as indicated in 
the foregoing discussion [of Rose and its progeny], the 
matter is not res nova under our case law. And if the life of 
the law has not been logic but experience, see O. Holmes, 
The Common Law 1 (1881), we are entitled to stand back 
and see what would be accomplished by such an extension 
in this case. The omitted element was materiality. 
Petitioner underreported $5 million on his tax returns, and 
did not contest the element of materiality at trial. 
Petitioner does not suggest that he would introduce any 
evidence bearing upon the issue of materiality if so allowed. 
Reversal without any consideration of the effect of the error 
upon the verdict would send the case back for retrial—a 
retrial not focused at all on the issue of materiality, but on 
contested issues on which the jury was properly instructed. 
We do not think the Sixth Amendment requires us to veer 
away from settled precedent to reach such a result.253 
This is a remarkable paragraph. On the surface, the Court’s 
appeal to pragmatism is attractive. Remanding for a retrial in 
the circumstances described would seem to be the epitome of a 
mindless, logical formalism. But the passage ignores that the 
then newly minted legal regime the Court created in Fulminante 
to govern whether constitutional trial error is amenable to 
                                                     
 249. Neder, 527 U.S. at 10–11 (citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). 
 250. See supra note 241 (discussing Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 406–07 & n.11 
(1991)). 
 251. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 252. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 30–39 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (endorsing Sullivan, of which he was the author, in very strong terms). Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia’s opinion. Id. Justice Stevens also wrote 
separately and disagreed with the majority’s harmless-error analysis. See id. 25–27 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 253. Id. at 15. 
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harmless-error review254 calls for a logical and formalist analysis, 
and not a pragmatic and realistic one. Fulminante instructs that 
errors causing structural defects in the constitution of the trial 
mechanism defy analysis by harmless-error standards and 
require automatic reversal.255 And Sullivan instructs that a 
verdict from a properly instructed jury is essential to the 
constitution of the trial mechanism within the meaning of 
Fulminante.256 If the Neder majority thought the Fulminante 
regime to be too constraining, it should have said so explicitly. It 
should not have pretended that its decision was consistent with 
that regime. The Fulminante framework, like the Chapman 
principle that it serves to elaborate, is constitutional common 
law.257 And as with other common law doctrines, it should 
explicitly evolve if and when its shortcomings become apparent. 
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, Justice Alito authored a 
dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Kennedy and Thomas, in which he sought to recast Fulminante 
in a way that would make the Neder decision more defensible 
when viewed in the light of Fulminante and Sullivan.258 Justice 
Alito wrote: 
The majority’s focus on the “trial error”/“structural defect” 
dichotomy is misleading. In Fulminante, we used these 
terms to denote two poles of constitutional error that had 
appeared in prior cases; trial errors always lead to 
harmless-error review, while structural errors always lead 
to automatic reversal. We did not suggest that trial errors 
are the only sorts of errors amenable to harmless-error 
review, or that all errors affecting the framework within 
which the trial proceeds are structural. The touchstone of 
structural error is fundamental unfairness and 
unreliability. Automatic reversal is strong medicine that 
should be reserved for constitutional errors that always or 
necessarily produce such unfairness.259 
The majority responded by stating: 
The dissent criticizes us for our trial error/structural defect 
dichotomy, asserting that Fulminante never said that trial 
                                                     
 254. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–12 (1991). Note that Neder was 
decided in 1999 and Fulminante was decided in 1991. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored 
each opinion. 
 255. Id. at 309–10. 
 256. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993). 
 257. See supra Part II.B. 
 258. 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (holding that denial of counsel of one’s choice is 
structural error not subject to review for harmlessness). 
 259. Id. at 159 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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errors are the only sorts of errors amenable to 
harmless-error review, or that all errors affecting the 
framework within which the trial proceeds are structural. 
Although it is hard to read that case as doing anything 
other than dividing constitutional error into two 
comprehensive categories, our ensuing analysis in fact 
relies neither upon such comprehensiveness nor upon trial 
error as the touchstone for the availability of 
harmless-error review. Rather, here, as we have done in the 
past, we rest our conclusion of structural error upon the 
difficulty of assessing the effect of the error.260 
The majority is correct; it is difficult to read Fulminante in 
the manner proposed by the Gonzalez-Lopez dissent. And yet, the 
dissent’s impulse to abandon the formalistic Fulminante 
framework is sound. The costs of applying the Fulminante 
framework rigorously and faithfully are simply too high to 
bear.261 Moreover, commentators have persuasively argued, 
Fulminante’s requirement that structural errors be automatically 
reversed has had the negative collateral consequence of causing 
lower courts to define structural rights too narrowly.262 The 
Court therefore should abandon the Fulminante framework in 
favor of a more realistic and pragmatic approach to 
harmless-error review. But it should do so explicitly, and not 
through precedential subterfuge of the sort displayed in Neder. 
                                                     
 260. Id. at 149 n.4 (majority opinion) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 261. The Court’s unwillingness to abide by Fulminante is not only evident in its 
decisions addressed to review of instructional error that causes the jury not to find each 
element of the offense charged under the proper legal standard. Other errors that seem 
“structural”—or at the very least seem not to be “quantitatively assess[able] in the context 
of the other evidence presented” and therefore not susceptible to harmless-error analysis, 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991) (describing “trial errors” that are 
subject to harmless-error review)—that the Court recently has subjected to 
harmless-error review include improper judicial involvement in plea negotiations, United 
States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2149 (2013); improper denial of a state-provided 
peremptory challenge, Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 160–61 (2009); and the failure to 
submit to the jury a sentencing factor that the jury should have decided, Washington v. 
Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218–22 (2006). 
 262. See Coenen, supra note 15, at 1235–39; Levinson, supra note 15, at 891–92; 
Shephard, supra note 15, at 1185–1205; Karlan, supra note 15, at 2021. Precedent 
containing an overly narrow definition of a right can then, in turn, wreak havoc when it is 
applied in other remedial contexts. See Coenen, supra note 15, at 1235–39 (noting that 
the high costs of automatic reversal at the appellate level cause appellate courts to set 
high precedential standards for trial courts to meet to order a reversal, although it is 
much less costly to cure these errors at the trial level than at the appellate level). 
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C. Recent Habeas Cases 
In its 1993 Brecht v. Abrahamson decision, the Supreme 
Court decided to abandon the “stringent” Chapman principle for 
a “less onerous” test for evaluating the harmfulness of 
constitutional error challenged on collateral review.263 The Court 
justified its action by pointing to the state’s interest in the 
finality of convictions that had survived direct review, comity, 
federalism, the interest of maintaining the prominence of the 
trial itself (which often had taken place years earlier), the 
difficulty of retrials years after the original trial, and a perceived 
imbalance between other costs and benefits of continuing to 
apply Chapman on habeas.264 Since Brecht, the Court has become 
even more demanding in its descriptions of what habeas 
petitioners must show in order to establish harm and secure 
collateral relief for convictions tainted by constitutional error.265 
This change in the law of harmless-error review has been, if 
not popular among civil libertarians and others who desire closer 
federal oversight of state criminal processes, certainly defensible. 
Retrying a successful habeas petitioner years after the original 
conviction is difficult, given the erosion of memory and the 
dispersion of witnesses,266 and the other reasons Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the author of Brecht, provided in support of its 
holding also are far from trivial. Unfortunately, however, Brecht 
and its progeny have worked their change—part of a 
decades-long transformation of habeas from a regime preoccupied 
with the vindication of federal rights into a regime principally 
concerned with whether petitioners are guilty or innocent267—
through a treatment of precedent that has shown insufficient 
regard for rule-of-law values. 
Consider, first, Brecht’s treatment of Kotteakos,268 which 
Brecht purported to adopt as the new standard for evaluating 
whether constitutional trial error had been harmless on 
                                                     
 263. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
 264. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635–37 (1993). For further discussion on 
Brecht, see supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra notes 102–111 and accompanying text. 
 266. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 
 267. For an excellent account of this shift and an argument that a new movement 
towards greater regard for procedural interests may be underway, see generally Justin F. 
Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2071 (2014). 
 268. Recall that Kotteakos contained an elaboration of how to apply 28 U.S.C. § 391, 
the statutory predecessor to the present harmless-error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111. See 
supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. 
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collateral review.269 Recall again how, in Kotteakos, the Court 
was at pains to emphasize that harmless-error analysis must 
look to the likely effect of the error on the jury, and not be based 
on the reviewing court’s opinion whether the jury likely would 
have convicted had the error not occurred.270 Indeed, as we have 
just seen, a careful reading of Justice Rutledge’s Kotteakos 
opinion has caused many commentators—including some 
Supreme Court Justices—to question whether the analysis 
Kotteakos prescribes materially differs from that required by 
Chapman.271 In any event, clearly, Kotteakos does not say or 
intimate that an error is to be held harmless if the defendant 
fails to show that he likely would have been acquitted but for the 
error. 
Brecht badly mischaracterizes Kotteakos in adopting it as the 
harmless-error standard to govern collateral review. Brecht 
contains no admonition against using the likelihood of conviction 
absent the error as a proxy for harmlessness. Nor does it say 
anything about how Kotteakos emphasized the need to keep the 
focus on whether the error likely affected the jury. Instead, 
Brecht says that the Kotteakos standard requires a habeas 
petitioner to show—Brecht summarily places the burden of 
persuasion on the petitioner despite Kotteakos’s indication that 
the burden should lie with the government when the error is 
nontechnical272—more than just a “reasonable possibility” that 
the error contributed to the verdict.273 But this “reasonable 
possibility” language does not come from Kotteakos; indeed it is 
patently in tension with what Justice Rutledge says in explaining 
how courts are to determine whether an error should be treated 
as harmless.274 Rather, it is reverse engineered from a passage in 
Chapman indicating that an error is not harmless if there is a 
“reasonable possibility” that it “might have contributed to the 
conviction.”275 Thus, a blatant logical fallacy underlies Brecht’s 
adoption of a more-than-a-reasonable-possibility standard: 
                                                     
 269. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 272. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765–66 (1946). 
 273. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). For further discussion on Brecht, see supra notes 89–99. 
 274. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 (“But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after 
pondering all that happened without striping the erroneous action from the whole, that 
the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that 
substantial rights were not affected.”) For Justice Rutlege’s full explanation, see supra 
note 38 and accompanying text. 
 275. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 
85, 86–87 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Brecht posits (dubiously, as we have seen)276 that the Kotteakos 
standard is appreciably more forgiving of error than the 
Chapman standard, observes that Chapman requires a remedy if 
there is a “reasonable possibility” that the error “might have 
contributed to the verdict,”277 and infers from this requirement of 
Chapman the logically faulty conclusion that Kotteakos requires 
more than such a reasonable possibility.278 
Even more tenuously, Brecht then uses the phrase “actual 
prejudice” to describe the more-than-a-reasonable-possibility 
showing that, Brecht says, Kotteakos requires for an applicant to 
obtain a remedy.279 But again here, the phrase “actual prejudice” 
does not appear in Kotteakos; it comes from United States v. 
Lane, a 1986 decision authored by Chief Justice Burger that used 
the phrase without citation in purporting to apply Kotteakos to 
find that a misjoinder of criminal defendants under Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 8(b)280 had been harmless.281 
More importantly, it is a component of what petitioners seeking 
to establish ineffective assistance of counsel ordinarily must 
show in order to establish a constitutional violation.282 And in 
that context, it means showing a “reasonable probability” of a 
different outcome but for the error.283 Thus, Brecht effectively 
signals that a habeas petitioner must establish a “reasonable 
probability” of nonconviction but for the error—a showing that is 
far more onerous than the one Justice Rutledge prescribed in 
Kotteakos.284 This signal was reinforced by Brecht’s application of 
Kotteakos in its brief explanation of why the error at petitioner’s 
trial had been harmless. Brecht focused heavily on the evidence 
                                                     
 276. See supra notes 220–224 and accompanying text. 
 277. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 
 278. See id. It is of course logically possible for the two standards to differ 
appreciably and yet for both to support a conclusion that there has been harm if there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. 
 279. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 280. Rule 8(b) states: 
The indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants if they are 
alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series 
of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses. The defendants may 
be charged in one or more counts together or separately. All defendants need not 
be charged in each count. 
 281. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446–49. 
 282. See, e.g., Roe v. Flores Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481–82 (2000) (observing that, 
when a criminal defendant alleges that his or her attorney’s performance during a legal 
proceeding, either at trial or on appeal, was constitutionally ineffective, the defendant 
ordinarily must establish “actual prejudice”). 
 283. See id. at 482. (emphasis added) (defining “actual prejudice” as “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
 284. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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of guilt, and said nothing about the likelihood of the error playing 
a role in the jury’s decision to return a guilty verdict.285 
The Court’s more recent decisions addressing the standard 
for harmless error on collateral review continue the practice of 
applying precedent in a disingenuous manner. As explained 
above, in 1996 (three years after Brecht), Congress enacted 
§ 2254(d)(1) of the AEDPA, which bars habeas relief for errors of 
law unless the error involved an unreasonable application of 
Supreme Court precedent.286 In 2003, in Mitchell v. Esparza, the 
Court held that § 2254(d)(1) bars habeas relief for constitutional 
error that was held harmless under Chapman by a state 
appellate court unless that court’s application of Chapman was 
unreasonable.287 Then, in 2007, in Fry v. Pliler, the Court 
rejected an argument that § 2254(d)(1), as interpreted in 
Esparza, had effectively superseded Brecht.288 
In describing the petitioner’s argument as “implausible” and 
reaffirming the continuing applicability of Brecht, Justice Scalia 
(the author of Fry) characterized Brecht’s “actual prejudice” 
standard as stricter than Esparza’s “more liberal 
AEDPA/Chapman standard, which requires only that the state 
court’s harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt determination be 
unreasonable.”289 In fact, Fry says, Brecht “obviously subsumes 
the [more liberal AEDPA/Chapman standard].”290 Thus, through 
this reinterpretation of Brecht, Fry effectively transforms 
Kotteakos—which, again, Brecht purports to adopt—into a 
standard that requires a habeas petitioner now to show 
something more than that no reasonable jurist could find the 
error harmless under Chapman. To borrow from the rhetorical 
style of Fry’s author: When one reads Justice Rutledge’s 
Kotteakos opinion291 and compares it with what Fry implies about 
its contents, one quickly comes to realize that we have entered 
The Land of Make-Believe. 
While Fry, through its treatment of Brecht, effectively 
catapulted the Kotteakos standard past the point where it might 
reasonably be described as merely “permissive” or “forgiving” of 
error—perhaps “hippie-parent indulgent” would come closer to 
                                                     
 285. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra notes 17, 100–101 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 289. Fry v. Pliler, 551, U.S. 112, 119–20 (2007) (emphasis added); see also supra 
notes 104–105 and accompanying text. 
 290. Fry, 551 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added); see also supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
 291. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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doing it justice—Davis v. Ayala, decided in 2015, sought to dispel 
any misperception that the “more liberal” AEDPA/Chapman 
standard is in fact petitioner-friendly. As we have just seen, Fry 
stated that Brecht (and thus Kotteakos) “subsumes” the 
AEDPA/Chapman standard described in Esparza. In recognition 
of the logical rule that satisfaction of a more demanding burden 
of persuasion always will constitute satisfaction of a less 
demanding burden of persuasion when the former subsumes the 
latter,292 Fry also acknowledged that there is no reason to require 
formal application of both tests.293 
Nonetheless, Justice Alito (author of the Ayala majority 
opinion) criticized the Ninth Circuit for declining to perform the 
logically unnecessary analysis of whether the state court’s 
harmlessness determination under Chapman was itself 
reasonable.294 Concluding that the state appellate court had not 
unreasonably applied Chapman, Ayala made it very clear that 
satisfying the putatively “more liberal” AEDPA/Chapman 
standard is not to be a walk in the park. To prevail under this 
standard, petitioners must show that “fair-minded jurists could 
[not] disagree on [the] correctness” of the state appellate court 
finding that a challenged error was harmless under Chapman.295 
Put another way, habeas petitioners must establish that the 
state appellate court’s decision “was so lacking in justification 
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 
existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded 
disagreement.”296 Thus, given the holding in Fry, habeas 
petitioners now apparently must make some unspecified showing 
beyond this in order to establish that constitutional error was 
harmful within the meaning of Brecht/Kotteakos.297 One simply 
                                                     
 292. Similarly, a failure to satisfy a less demanding burden of persuasion always will 
constitute a failure to satisfy a more demanding burden of persuasion when the latter 
subsumes the former. 
 293. Fry, 551 U.S. at 120; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 294. Ayala v. Davis, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015). For further discussion of criticism 
of lower courts’ application of Fry, see supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text. 
Conducting the AEDPA/Chapman analysis prescribed in Esparza was logically 
unnecessary because the Ninth Circuit, in a divided panel opinion, concluded that the 
petitioner had satisfied the more demanding Brecht test. See Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2196–97. 
 295. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 296. Id. 
 297. To be sure, the Court continues to describe the Brecht/Kotteakos test as 
requiring a showing of “actual prejudice.” Id. As we have seen, “actual prejudice” is a 
phrase that does not come from Kotteakos, but that in other contexts requires showing a 
reasonable probability of nonconviction but for the error. See supra notes 279–284 and 
accompanying text. But it is not at all evident how the “actual prejudice” test can be 
described as more demanding than the AEDPA/Chapman test that it is said to subsume. 
The “actual prejudice” test is entirely different in kind from the AEDPA/Chapman test. It 
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cannot read Justice Rutledge’s opinion and maintain that this is 
a principled distillation of Kotteakos. 
Again, my purpose is not to quarrel with the Court’s 
adoption of a very tough standard for establishing the 
harmfulness of error on collateral review. Perhaps the standard 
the Court has adopted is appropriate in view of the factors it 
cited in Brecht for moving away from Chapman.298 But, I submit, 
institutional damage is done when the Court purports to root its 
new standard in precedent that says nothing of the sort. Brecht 
and its progeny are constitutional common law—a type of law 
that, again, is supposed to evolve as data and experience reveal a 
need for change. The Court should be forthright about the fact 
that it perceived a need for change. It should not pretend that its 
recent holdings are anchored in precedent that not only do not 
say what they are cited for saying, but actually say something 
close to the opposite. The Court invites cynicism and undermines 
its reputation as an institution guided by principle when it 
behaves in this way. 
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS 
Part I demonstrates that Congress and the Supreme Court 
are largely unconstrained by constitutional limitations in 
fashioning harmless-error doctrines to govern on direct and 
collateral review. Part II shows that there is a serious need for 
doctrinal reform in both contexts. Part III seeks to initiate a 
discussion about the paths that reform might take. Most of this 
Part’s suggestions for reform flow naturally from arguments 
developed in Parts I and II. To the extent that they press beyond 
the foundation laid earlier in the paper, they are preliminary and 
designed to provoke thought and, hopefully, conversation about 
how the present approach to harmless-error review might be 
improved. 
                                                     
looks at the likelihood of a different result had the trial error not occurred, while the 
AEDPA/Chapman test focuses on whether appellate judges reasonably could conclude 
that the error was harmless under Chapman. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197–99 (explaining the 
different requirements of each test). The two tests are not logically interrelated; they are 
apples and oranges. 
 298. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635–37 (1946) (emphasizing the finality of 
convictions, comity, federalism, the interest of maintaining prominence of the trial itself, 
the difficulty of retrials years after the original trial, and a perceived imbalance of other 
costs and benefits of applying Chapman on collateral review); see also supra note 98 and 
accompanying text. 
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A. The Constitution & the Path to Reform 
As Part I shows, the Constitution requires reviewing courts 
to vacate or reverse convictions marred by constitutional error 
only in circumstances where the applicant for relief establishes 
that the statute underlying the conviction is unconstitutional on 
its face or cannot constitutionally be applied to the facts of the 
case.299 Beyond this, harmless-error analysis may proceed 
without constitutional constraint except that, of course, it may 
not be arbitrary or otherwise violate the equal-protection 
guarantee or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.300 
Importantly, this means that the Constitution does not 
forbid appellate courts or courts conducting collateral review 
from excusing errors that have resulted in missing jury findings 
or other structural defects, or even from adopting a 
harmless-error analysis that turns on nothing more than 
whether the error likely caused an innocent person to be 
wrongfully convicted of a crime. Transforming harmless-error 
analysis into mere prediction about likely innocence based on a 
cold appellate record would be a regrettable development, but it 
would not violate the Constitution. 
B. A Unitary Standard (and Abandoning Chapman) 
As Part II.A shows, there is no reason to privilege 
constitutional errors by subjecting them to a different 
harmless-error test than that applied to “nonconstitutional” 
errors. There are at least three reasons for stopping the practice. 
First, there is no basis for concluding that, as a class, errors that 
the Court describes as “constitutional” always tend to work a 
greater harm on criminal defendants than those labeled 
“nonconstitutional.”301 Second, there is reason to doubt that 
judges and their clerks can and do make the fine distinctions 
required between a faithful application of Chapman to 
constitutional error and a faithful application of Kotteakos to 
nonconstitutional error.302 Third, there is a serious argument to 
be made that all infractions of the positive law that governs 
criminal trials are “constitutional” in that they violate the 
due-process guarantee, which (it may plausibly be argued) 
requires compliance with all procedural requirements that 
                                                     
 299. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 156–160 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 207–217 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 218–224 and accompanying text. 
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materially inform the process for obtaining criminal 
convictions.303 
What, then, should the unitary standard be for evaluating 
errors amenable to harmless-error review?304 In my view, the 
approach for which Justice Traynor argued in the immediate 
aftermath of Chapman does the best job of legitimizing and 
rationalizing harmless-error doctrine, and of prescribing a 
remedial regime that American appellate judges might actually 
administer faithfully. Traynor called for rooting the 
harmless-error standard in 28 U.S.C. § 2111305 and construing 
the statute to direct reviewing courts to provide a remedy unless 
there is a “high probability” that the error did not affect the 
jury’s judgment.306 
The merits of moving away from a standard based in 
constitutional common law (the most plausible understanding of 
Chapman’s ontology307) and anchoring harmless-error review in 
§ 2111, the federal harmless-error statute, are straightforward. 
While constitutional common law is pervasive, there are many 
who contest its legitimacy.308 One need not align oneself with the 
critics of constitutional common law in order to see it as 
preferable to ground remedial doctrines in legislation that is 
perfectly constitutional and that reasonably can be construed to 
govern the problem under examination.309 Indeed, Chapman 
                                                     
 303. See supra notes 225–226 and accompanying text. 
 304. I leave to the next subsection consideration of whether there should be errors 
not subject to harmless-error review. 
 305. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 42–43. As Professor Meltzer argued, it is a 
stretch to treat Chapman as an elaboration of § 2111, given all that it contains and 
mandates. See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text. But if the Court were to 
jettison Chapman, there is no reason why § 2111 should not be held to govern the federal 
harmless-error field, notwithstanding the fact that it textually describes only those errors 
that reviewing courts should disregard. See supra note 9. If we can infer a “negative” or 
“dormant” commerce clause doctrine from constitutional text that in terms confers only a 
power to regulate, surely we can infer from statutory text admonishing courts to withhold 
remedies for a certain class of errors a directive that they continue to provide remedies—
in accordance with customary practice at the time the statute was adopted, see supra Part 
II.A—for errors that do not fall within the specified class. 
 306. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 43–51. 
 307. See supra Part II.B. 
 308. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of the Federal Courts, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1985); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the 
Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978). For a summary of an 
argument that remedial doctrines designed to address constitutional violations ought to 
originate with Congress, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.1.2, at 652 
(7th ed. 2016) (describing the dissenting opinions in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of 
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). 
 309. See supra note 305 and accompanying text. One might object that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2111 is inadequate to supplant Chapman because it does not in terms directly regulate 
state courts, as Chapman does. In fact, the text of § 2111 could be read to regulate state 
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itself recognized congressional prerogative to replace its 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt principle with an “appropriate” 
statutory standard.310 Mysteriously, however, Chapman did not 
even mention § 2111, let alone explain why an “appropriate” 
standard could not be distilled from it. 
In fact, as Traynor demonstrated, § 2111 is cast in general 
terms that are reasonably subject to translation into an 
“appropriate” and administrable harmless-error standard. The 
statute plausibly could be construed to give rise to at least three 
formulations that would accord with commonly applied proof 
standards: a test focusing on whether it was more probable than 
not that the error did not affect the jury (which would accord 
with the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard); a test focusing 
on whether it was highly probable that the error did not affect 
the jury (which would accord with the clear-and-convincing 
-evidence standard); and a test focusing on whether it was almost 
certain that the error did not affect the jury (which would accord 
with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test that Chapman did in 
fact adopt).311 Thus, there is no barrier to the Court grounding a 
new, unitary harmless-error standard in § 2111. 
After surveying the range of standards through which § 2111 
might reasonably be operationalized, Traynor argued that the 
Court should adopt the second, “highly probable” test—one that 
would accord with the clear-and-convincing evidence standard.312 
Traynor regarded the first, “more likely than not” test as 
inappropriate for two reasons: it would entail too great a risk of 
affirming judgments influenced by error, and it would tacitly 
invite reviewing courts to affirm whenever they believed that the 
jury had reached the correct result.313 He thought that the third, 
                                                     
courts. See supra note 9. And surely, if the Supreme Court can regulate the state courts 
through constitutional common law as it did in Chapman, it also would be within 
Congress’s power to regulate directly the provision of remedies for constitutional 
violations that occur in state criminal trials. In any event, even if § 2111 is (more 
plausibly) read only to regulate federal courts, it clearly regulates the Supreme Court, 
which of course has jurisdiction to review how state appellate courts administer remedies 
for violations of federal law during state criminal trials. Because state appellate courts 
ought to recognize the primacy of any harmless-error standard that Congress might 
lawfully require the Supreme Court to use to review their treatment of federal trial error, 
the effect of such congressional regulation of the Supreme Court should be a de facto 
imposition of the statute’s harmless-error standard on state appellate courts. 
 310. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967). 
 311. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 33–37, 42–51. 
 312. See id. at 45. 
 313. See id. at 35. I fully agree with Traynor’s assessment of the first test. Even 
under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, erroneous convictions are too often 
upheld. See Poulin, supra note 70, at 996 (noting that appellate courts had affirmed 
through written opinions the convictions of 133 of the first 200 defendants exonerated by 
DNA evidence, and that nearly a third of these opinions had noted error but concluded 
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“beyond a reasonable doubt” test, if faithfully applied, simply 
invited too many reversals and thus risked a return to the days 
when appellate courts reversed indiscriminately.314 In contrast, 
he thought the second test sufficiently demanding and properly 
calibrated.315 Moreover, the second test could be administered 
without inevitably morphing into either a rule of near-automatic 
reversal or a rule of near-automatic affirmance in cases where 
there is strong evidence of guilt.316 
In 2016, there is little reason for concern about appellate 
courts construing the Chapman principle as a rule calling for 
nearly automatic reversals. Harmless-error rulings are 
commonplace and in no way discouraged by the Supreme 
Court.317 The more pertinent question today is whether, if the 
Court were to discard the Chapman principle in favor of a “high 
probability” test grounded in § 2111, would more errors be 
forgiven? I think not—especially if the Court were careful to 
explain its move as grounded not in a desire to decrease the rate 
at which appellate remedies are provided, but rather in a desire 
to clarify a badly muddled doctrine and to more accurately 
rationalize and describe the present realities of harmless-error 
review. For it is simply inaccurate to describe appellate practice 
today as one where courts tend to provide remedies unless they 
are nearly certain that the error played no role in the jury’s 
decision to convict, as the Chapman principle purports to 
require.318 
Indeed, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt proof standard has 
always been inapt for use in connection with harmless-error 
review. The standard derives, of course, from the burden of proof 
that juries are instructed to apply in determining whether to 
return a guilty verdict and convict a criminal defendant of a 
crime. But before making such a finding, the jury is exposed to 
all of the admissible evidence that the government and the 
defendant wish it to see and hear about what actually happened. 
In other words, within the American criminal system, the finding 
                                                     
that it was harmless) (citing Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
55, 95, 107–08 (2008)). 
 314. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 35–37, 43–44. 
 315. See id. at 44–45. 
 316. See id. at 49–51. 
 317. See generally supra Parts II.B, II.C. 
 318. See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text (describing the inconsistent ways 
in which the Court has operationalized Chapman); see also Poulin, supra note 70, at 
1023–36 (exhaustively documenting the myriad ways—all inconsistent with a strict 
reading of Chapman—in which courts since Chapman have exercised their power to 
withhold remedies for constitutional error during the trial process on the ground that it 
did not cause “harm”). 
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of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is supposed to follow exposure 
to all admissible facts that reasonably might be thought to bear 
on that finding. 
But reviewing courts are (quite sensibly) precluded from 
considering direct evidence about the jury’s deliberations; they 
can only speculate about how a rational jury likely would have 
made use of the evidence with which it was presented.319 When 
the nature of the inquiry is inherently and necessarily 
hypothetical, why demand a conclusion—as Chapman does—
under a standard that purports to forswear doubt (or at least 
“reasonable” doubt) about its correctness? The conscientious 
judicial mind should almost always harbor doubt about 
conclusions reached not through evidence, but through 
hypothesis and conjecture. Thus, by its very nature, the 
Chapman principle requires a conclusion that the conscientious 
judge should balk at reaching. No wonder then that, as a 
practical matter, harmless-error analysis quickly moved away 
from a strict reading of Chapman and towards a more judicially 
administrable regime—one that the “high probability” standard 
more accurately describes as a matter of reality.320 
In sum, the Court should stop privileging constitutional 
error and abandon Chapman in favor of a unitary harmless-error 
standard that does not ask judges to express near-certitude about 
a conclusion that by its very nature is somewhat doubtful. The 
Court should describe its new standard as an elaboration of 28 
U.S.C. § 2111, the federal harmless-error statute. Finally, the 
Court should consider a clarifying reform—i.e., adoption of a 
“high probability” harmless-error test—that would more 
accurately rationalize and describe the rather highly qualified 
willingness of today’s appellate courts to provide remedies for 
errors that occur during the process leading to criminal 
convictions. 
C. Abandoning Fulminante 
Again, the Constitution does not require a rule of automatic 
reversal in situations other than where an applicant for relief 
establishes the unconstitutionality of the statute of conviction, 
either facially or as-applied.321 That said, adherence to basic 
constitutional values and sound public policy require that 
convictions infected by certain types of error never be permitted 
                                                     
 319. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (precluding post hoc inquiry into the nature of the 
jury’s deliberations other than in rare circumstances). 
 320. See supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra note 190. 
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to stand. Unfortunately, as Part II.B shows, the trial 
error/structural defect framework that the Supreme Court 
prescribed in Fulminante does a very poor job of drawing the line 
of demarcation between such errors and the default category of 
errors, to which harmless-error review applies. Fulminante 
permits instances of egregious government misconduct—e.g., the 
admission into evidence of a coerced confession322—to go without 
a remedy. And if faithfully implemented (which it has not been), 
it also can require remedies for relatively inconsequential errors 
committed by government actors acting in good faith.323 The 
Court can do better than Fulminante in defining the class of 
errors that should not be subject to harmless-error review. 
How might the Court pursue reform in this area? It might 
start by acknowledging that, regardless of their guilt, persons 
convicted of crimes who press claims of error on direct and 
collateral review serve as private attorneys general and, in that 
role, function as essential instruments for ensuring proper regard 
for fundamental constitutional criminal rules.324 In determining 
what constitutional criminal rules are so “fundamental” that 
their infraction always requires a remedy, we might start by 
noting the apparent agreement among all current Supreme Court 
Justices that the fair-trial guarantee always requires, at the very 
least, an impartial judge, a jury instruction that correctly states 
the relevant standard of proof, assistance of counsel for the 
accused, and a fair jury.325 Thus, errors undermining these 
foundational elements of the American criminal trial never 
should be subjected to harmless-error review. 
                                                     
 322. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 323. Cf. supra notes 242–253 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme 
Court’s struggle, in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), to rationalize a 
harmless-error doctrine to govern in circumstances where the jury did not find an element 
of the offense but where no rational jury could have failed to make such a finding had it 
been properly instructed). 
 324. Harmless-error doctrine has been subjected to withering criticism over the years 
for failing to account for values other than the accuracy of criminal convictions—e.g., 
restraining human rights abuses and protecting the dignity of the accused—that 
constitutional criminal procedure rights are designed to protect. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, 
Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO. L. J. 1509, 1554–
55 (2009); Ogletree, supra note 15, at 161–72: Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking 
Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 88–89 (1988). 
 325. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 158 (2006) (describing 
elements of the trial structure whose deprivation necessarily renders a criminal trial 
fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence) (citing 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999)) (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J. 
& Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J.). The Justices in the Gonzalez-Lopez majority appear to 
have a broader conception of the fair-trial guarantee and therefore likely would agree that 
it contains the elements specified in Justice Alito’s dissent. 
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For similar reasons, I submit, constitutional violations 
rooted in discrimination on the basis of race and other immutable 
characteristics always undermine fundamental values.326 
Sensitivity to our ugly history of racism, sexism, and other forms 
of unconstitutional prejudice, and the grave harm their 
persistence inflicts on our institutions of justice, demand that 
nothing short of a zero-tolerance policy be applied when some 
agent of government violates the equal protection guarantee 
through invidious discrimination.327 Indeed, we might well 
consider going a step or two further and holding that intentional 
misconduct by a government actor of any sort undermines 
fundamental values and should automatically yield a remedy 
when demonstrated to the satisfaction of a reviewing court. In 
any event, the important point is that there is a glaring need to 
move beyond the Fulminante standard, which lacks practicality 
and therefore is not faithfully and predictably administered. 
D. Abandoning Brecht 
As Part II.C shows, the Supreme Court has engaged in a 
disingenuous treatment of precedent to create a harmless-error 
test to govern collateral review that will rarely yield a remedy. In 
order to establish that a constitutional trial error requires a new 
trial, habeas petitioners must satisfy a standard—supposedly 
rooted in Brecht/Kotteakos—that is in some unexplained way 
more demanding than the AEDPA/Chapman standard, which 
                                                     
 326. In one context where claims of unlawful discrimination often arise—the use of 
peremptory challenges to jurors during the jury selection process (see, e.g., Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), where the Court held that unconstitutional race-based 
challenges and prescribing a process for resolving claims of error)—the federal appeals 
courts have unanimously concluded that a proven constitutional violation never can be 
harmless error. See, e.g., United States v. McAllister, 693 F.3d 572, 582 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(Batson error is structural and can never be harmless); Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 
618, 632 (7th Cir. 2011) (same); Williams v. Woodford, 396 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(same); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); Ford v. Norris, 67 
F.3d 162, 171 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1225 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1992) (same); United States v. Legrand, 483 Fed App’x 771, 777 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(unpublished opinion) (same); see also Vazquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260–64 (1986) 
(pre-Fulminante decision holding that racial discrimination in the grand jury process is 
not amenable to harmless-error review); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 & 
n.9 (1979) (pre-Fulminante decision holding that a criminal conviction is void if the 
prosecutor deliberately challenged the defendant because of his race). 
 327. Cf. Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136, 1137–38 (2013) (statement of 
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer joined) (respecting the denial of the petition 
for a writ of certiorari the Court denounced in extremely strong terms an appeal to racial 
prejudice made by the federal prosecutor at trial, collected authority demonstrating that 
such appeals were once commonplace, and opined that “[s]uch conduct diminishes the 
dignity of our criminal justice system and undermines respect for the rule of law”). 
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Brecht/Kotteakos is said to subsume.328 But even though the 
Brecht/Kotteakos standard is said to subsume the 
AEDPA/Chapman standard, and even though habeas courts are 
not required formally to apply both tests, Ayala makes clear that 
habeas courts will act at their peril if they skip over the 
AEDPA/Chapman test, and apply only the more demanding 
Brecht/Kotteakos test.329 
In my view, the Court’s test for assessing whether error was 
harmless on collateral review is far too forgiving. While Brecht 
may have been reasonable in making it more difficult for habeas 
petitioners who have demonstrated error to obtain a new trial, 
the AEDPA—enacted three years after Brecht—is more than 
adequate to address the concerns that animated Brecht. Under 
the AEDPA, habeas petitioners are unable to obtain relief 
without establishing clear error in light of Supreme Court 
precedent and that a state appellate court’s harmlessness 
determination (if there was one) was itself unreasonable.330 
These showings are far from easy to make, especially if the 
harmlessness determination were to be recast in the “high 
probability” terms for which I argue. In short, the “high 
probability” test ought to apply on both direct and collateral 
review. 
Be that as it may, a majority of the Court apparently does 
not agree that the AEDPA is sufficiently strict. At the very least, 
however, the Court should come up with a regime less dismissive 
of rule-of-law values, and more judicially administrable, than 
that prescribed by Fry and Ayala. Perhaps the Court believes 
that habeas petitioners must show some likelihood of innocence. 
After all, the Constitution imposes no barrier to the imposition of 
such a standard. But if so, the Court should say so explicitly and 
forthrightly. For as matters now stand, the tests for determining 
whether an error should be excused as harmless on habeas are 
extraordinarily difficult to understand and administer. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Nearly half a century ago, Justice Traynor described 
then-nascent harmless-error doctrines as giving rise to a “riddle.” 
Today, “quagmire” would be a more apt descriptor. The complex 
series of doctrines governing the provision of remedies responsive 
                                                     
 328. See supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra notes 294–296 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra notes 286–287 and accompanying text. 
Do Not Delete  9/21/2016 5:34 PM 
2016] HARMLESS ERROR REVISITED 123 
to constitutional violations committed during the criminal trial 
process are badly in need of reform. 
As we have seen, the path to reform is almost entirely 
unobstructed by constitutional limitations. Hopefully, the 
Supreme Court will come to agree that a housecleaning is 
needed, and will consider steps aimed at making harmless-error 
review more realistic, more consistent across contexts, and more 
transparent about its animating values. The Court could start 
this process by adopting a unitary harmless-error test to govern 
all error, abandoning the unrealistic trial error/structural defect 
framework for assessing whether errors can be excused, and 
simplifying and clarifying its approach to harmless-error review 
on collateral review. 
